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INTRODUCTION

The fourth issue of the first volume of the Kosovo Security Sector Observer (KSSO), discusses analytically the key issues of the sectors of internal affairs, intelligence, the Security Council, and of the Security Force, which have dominated the public debate and the parliamentary oversight of these sectors during the period March 15 – July 15, 2016. In a separate public policy analysis the KSSO also discusses the (non)cooperation of the Kosovo Police with INTERPOL, and, at the end, it presents the results of the public opinion survey of the trust regarding the security issues, in the respective governmental institutions, their leaders, as well as in the respective parliamentary commissions.

The internal affairs section provides a brief analysis of the developments related to terrorism, the work of the Commission on the Security, Internal Affairs and the Oversight of the Kosovo Security Force, and it also presents the findings of the public opinion survey of the trust of Kosovo's citizens regarding security issues, in the Minister of Internal Affairs, in the Kosovo Police, as well as in the respective Parliamentary Commission.

The section on the Kosovo Security Force discusses the statements that link the creation of the Kosovo Armed Forces with the demarcation of the border between Kosovo and Montenegro, the relations of Kosovo with NATO in the light of the Warsaw Summit, the work of the Commission on Security, Internal Affairs and the Oversight of the Kosovo Security Force, and it also presents the findings of the public opinion survey of the trust of citizens regarding security issues, in the Minister of the KSF, the Kosovo Security Force, and in the respective Parliamentary Commission.

The section on intelligence and the Security Council discusses the (non)functioning of the Kosovo Security Council, as well as the findings of the public opinion survey of the trust of citizens regarding security issues, in the Kosovo Intelligence Agency, in its Director, as well as in the respective Parliamentary Commission. At the end of this issue of the KSSO, we provide a short analysis of the key findings of the public opinion survey of the trust of citizens in the Kosovo security sector institutions, which was conducted on May 2016. Besides the description of the actual trust, this section analyses the trends of its change, by comparing the results of the actual survey with the same surveys conducted earlier, that is, in July and November, 2015, and February 2016.

1. THE MONITORING OF THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS SECTOR

Introduction

During the period March 15 – July 15, 2016, the key public issues regarding the Internal Affairs Sector was that of terrorism, as well as several writings that appeared in some from the most prestigious international newspapers and media.

This chapter will discuss the section on Kosovo, of the Report of the US Department of State on Terrorism (June 2015), the implications of the participation of Kosovo citizens in terrorist organizations in Iraq and Syria, the imprisonings and trials on terrorism, the writings of the international media on the links of Kosovo with terrorism, as well as the reactions on those writings, of the representatives of the Kosovo Government.

Also, a separate section will treat the oversight of the Internal Affairs sector conducted by the Parliamentary Commission on Security, Internal Affairs and the oversight of the KSF, as well as the trust of citizens in the institutions of this sector.

The Report on Terrorism of the US Department of State

The section on Kosovo, of the Report on Terrorism of the US Department of State, of June 2^d, 2016,¹ presents the progress, as well as the flaws and obstacles with which the Kosovo's governmental institutions are confronted in fighting terrorism. Besides the progress that was achieved so far, this Report ascertains the following key institutional flaws and obstacles of Kosovo's Internal Affairs sector for fighting terrorism:

- a) The communication and the information sharing, which are qualified as a challenge for the rule of law enforcement bodies.
- b) The lack of adequate resources of the Directorate Against Terrorism of the Kosovo Police, which influences its capacity for discovering the terrorism suspects.
- c) The lack of connection between the electronic system for border management and INTERPOL, as well as the fact that this electronic system does not always function properly.
- d) The mediation of UNMIK and EULEX between Kosovo and INTERPOL and EUROPOL, which slows the cooperation and impedes Kosovo in having access to their control lists.
- e) The opposition of Kosovo's membership in INTERPOL by Serbia and other countries that have not recognized it.
- f) The obstacles to Kosovo's participation in numerous regional initiatives against terrorism, which are caused by its non-recognition by Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Whilst the flaws of the internal affairs sector (points a and b) can be fixed with strengthening of the institutional interaction, which is, ultimately, designated in the National Strategy of the Republic of Kosovo Against Terrorism, 2012 – 2017² – a strategy which is lead by the National Coordinator Against Terrorism – as well as with the increase of the resources for the Directorate Against Terrorism of the Kosovo Police, the other flaws and obstacles can hardly be fixed at all, given that they depend on the international constellation of the recognitions of Kosovo, as well as on the attitudes that other states have on Kosovo's independence.

¹ The Report on Terrorism of the US Department of State, June 2^d, 2016, section on Kosovo, http://photos.state.gov/libraries/kosovo/312585/2016/CRT2015_alb.pdf (07/22/2016).

² Strategjia Kombëtare e Republikës së Kosovës Kundër Terrorizmit, 2012–2017, http://www.mpb-ks.org/repository/docs/Strategy_for_Counter_Terrorism_2012-2017_alb.pdf.

Nevertheless, a worrisome reality remains, that, despite of the fact that the Government of Kosovo has determined the fight against terrorism as its priority, it was necessary to wait for four years after the formulation of the National Strategy Against Terrorism, until the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, Mr. Valdet Hoxha, was appointed, in May of this year, into the post of National Coordinator Against Terrorism. There is no doubt that such a long delay in the appointment of the National Coordinator Against Terrorism has had consequences on the inter-institutional cooperation, as well as on the information-sharing, that are required for fighting terrorism. It is not accidental, therefore, that the request for inter-institutional cooperation and for timely sharing of informations, was the only public demand which the recently appointed National Coordinator, Mr. Hoxha, addressed to the working group for implementation of the Strategy Against Terrorism, in its meeting of July 1st, 2016.³

Activities Against Terrorism

According to the statements of the Minister of Internal Affairs, Mr. Skender Hyseni, ever since September of the last year, there was not even a single recorded case of any departure of Kosovo citizens for joining foreign wars,⁴ a fact that can be considered as a great achievement of Kosovo in fighting terrorism, despite the fact that this type of information is difficult to be verified.

On the other hand, the Internal Affairs Deputy Minister, Mr. Valdet Hoxha, has acknowledged that, up to the May of 2016, there were 314 Kosovo citizens (a figure that differs from the previous statements of the MIA), who have departed into the war zones in Syria and Iraq. 70 among them are still active as fighters, 57 were killed, and 40 are detained by the Directorate Against Terrorism.⁵ What is extremely important, according to these figures presented by the Deputy Minister Hoxha, the location of 147 citizens who are not in Syria and Iraq now, remains unclear – that is, it is not clear how many of them, when we exclude those who are in Syria or Iraq, and those who were killed or arrested, are in Kosovo, or

³ MIA: “U mbajt takimi i grupit punues për zbatim të Strategjisë Kundër Terrorizmit”, July 1st, 2016, <http://www.mpb-ks.org/?page=1,46,1668>.

⁴ Koha Ditore: Hyseni: Qe 10 muaj asnjë pjesëmarrës i Kosovës në luftra të huaja, June 10th, 2016, <http://koha.net/?id=27&l=117704>.

⁵ Proceedings of the Meeting of the Parliamentary Commission for Internal Affairs, Security, and the Oversight of the KSF, May 27th, 2016, http://www.kuvendikosoves.org/common/docs/proc/proc_2016_05_27_10_6484_al.pdf.

in other countries. Such a large number of citizens who were part of terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq, and whose location, as well as the goals for leaving the Middle East, are unknown, presents an extremely grave danger for Kosovo and abroad.

In contrast to previous arrests, during this reporting period, the Kosovo Police has achieved, for the first time, to arrest Kosovo citizens under the suspicion of financing terrorism. On this occasion we should stress that, ever since the first arrests of August 2014, the persons arrested were Kosovo citizens who have, either participated in the wars in Syria and Iraq, or who were recruiting people for going into these wars. Thus, the recent arrests, under the suspicions for financing terrorism, present an important achievement of the Kosovo Police in fighting terrorism.

Thus, on March 15 and 16, 2016, the Kosovo Police has arrested two persons, P.D. from Prizren, and F.R. from Prishtina, under the suspicion of terrorism,⁶ that is, of financing terrorism.⁷ The first suspect, P.D. was arrested “under the suspicion that he was involved in ‘financing or facilitation of terrorism’,” where “on at least one occasion he financed two persons with the goal of their participation in a terrorist group”.⁸ Meanwhile, according to the Police, the second suspect, F.R., “has put in continuity at the disposal his businesses, with the aim of sustaining and supporting financially and logistically the persons who are involved in the organization of, and the recruitment for, terrorism, including here the persons who are known for promotion of extremist ideology throughout Kosovo, as well as persons who have traveled, or have tried to travel, into the zones of conflict”.⁹

In these two cases of arrests for financing of terrorism by Kosovo Police, the court has determined the measure of detainment,¹⁰ and if the suspicions for financing terrorism will be proven by the prosecution during the legal process, this will also confirm that we have individuals and businesses in Kosovo that are supporting terrorism financially, that is, that the financing of terrorism is not coming only from the abroad.

⁶ Kosovo Police: Komunikatë Për Publikun, Drejtoria Kundër Terrorizmit e Policisë së Kosovës realizon dy operacione policore të suksesshme, March 16, 2016, <http://www.kosovopolicice.com/sq/informacione/drejtoria-kunder-terrorizmit-e-policise-se-kosoves-realizon-dy-operacione-policore-te-suksesshme> (27/07/2016) .

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Koha.net: Paraburgim për të dyshuarin për veprën “rekrutim, organizim dhe pjesëmarrje në terrorizëm”, March 17th, 2016, <http://koha.net/?id=27&l=103742> (27/07/2016).

Then, on March 18th, 2016, the Kosovo prosecution has charged a person with initials V.H., under the suspicions that he has participated in the activities of the terrorist organization ISIS.¹¹ Also, during this reporting period, the Kosovo courts have delivered two sentences for the cases related to terrorism. On March 25th, the Magistrate Court of Prishtina has sentenced three persons for participating in the war in Syria, in support of the terrorist groups.¹² Meanwhile, on May 20th, 2016, the Magistrate Court in Ferizaj has sentenced seven persons with 42 years of imprisonment, for recruitment, participation in terrorist groups, fund raising, promotion of hatred, division and non-tolerance among the national, racial, religious, ethnic and other groups that live in the Republic of Kosovo.¹³

Despite these developments in the country, according to international assessments, Kosovo is not yet considered as a country with high level of risk from terrorism. It should be stressed here that after the terrorist attacks in the “Ataturk” Airport in Istanbul, the Foreign Office of the Commonwealth in Great Britain has published a list of the states that are at risk from terrorism, which, as far as the level of risk is concerned, has ranked Kosovo in the third category, together with the Balkan states.¹⁴

The Linkage of Kosovo with Terrorism in the International Media

On several occasions during this reporting period, the linkage of Kosovo with terrorism was the main article in some from the most prestigious international media. Thus, the American *The New York Times* has devoted a long article to the growth of fundamentalism in Kosovo. Under the title “How Kosovo was turned into fertile ground for ISIS”,¹⁵ the article describes how Kosovars were radicalized, and, after that, recruited by a group of extremist imams and by secret associations financed by Saudi Arabia and other

¹¹ Koha.net: Aktakuzë kundër të dyshimitit për bashkëngjitje ISIS-it, 18 Mars 2016, <http://koha.net/?id=27&l=103856> (27/07/2016) .

¹² Koha.net: Dënohen me burg tre kosovarë për terrorizëm, March 25th, 2016, <http://koha.net/?id=27&l=105068> (29/07/2016).

¹³ Koha.net: Për terrorizëm 7 vetave 42 vjet burgim, May 20th, 2016, <http://koha.net/?id=27&l=114299> (29/07/2016).

¹⁴ Koha.net: Kosova në kategorinë e tretë për nga rreziku i terrorizmit, June 30th, 2016, <http://koha.net/?id=27&l=121229v> (29/07/2016).

¹⁵ The New York Times: How Kosovo was turned into fertile ground for isis, May 21, 2016.

arabic states of the Persian Gulf which preach the vahabism.¹⁶ The article then refers to 314 Kosovars who have joined the terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq, and it also mentions the lifting of the charges, and the arrests of 67 Kosovo citizens, under the suspicion of the recruitment for, and the participation in, the terrorist groups, as well as the closing of 19 organisations because of their anti-constitutional activities.¹⁷

The Minister of Interior Affairs, Mr. Skender Hyseni, has reacted on this article, and, in his reaction he said that the article “is built on the premises that are completely unsustainable”¹⁸, and, on the other hand, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Petrit Selimi, has addressed the New York Times editor with a response in which he stressed that the article did not take into the account the efforts made by the Kosovo Government.¹⁹ Meanwhile, the Ambassador of Kosovo in the US, Mss. Vlora Çitaku, in an interview for the Huffington Post, qualified the article as “only the half of the truth”. She didn’t dispute the article, and she said that “the article of the New York Times is true, but it tells only the half of the truth, and with two years of delay”.²⁰

Similar in discourse was the article of the AFP, which qualified Albania and Kosovo as a “new front” of the militants. In this article, the AFP mentions Albert Berisha, a Kosovo citizen who has been in Syria, and who is now under the investigation by the prosecution. The article also talks about the number of Kosovo citizens who have participated in the war in Syria and Iraq, thus “putting the country amid those that are most touched by jihadism per capita”.²¹

Meanwhile, the Radio Free Europe has published a writing with an interview with a 19-year old identified as Adem²² from Kaçanik, who had departed to Syria, and returned afterwards, for the reason that, according to his words, he understood that what was happening in Syria had nothing to do with Islam. In the interview, he tells that he participated in several preachings which radicalized him.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Koha.net: Hyseni: Artikulli i “New York Times” i shtrembëruar dhe i paqëndrueshëm, 30 Maj 2016, <http://koha.net/?id=27&l=115922> (28/07/2016)

¹⁹ Petrit Selimi, Letter to the Editor, New York Times, May 31, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/01/opinion/the-ways-that-kosovo-is-fighting-extremism.html?_r=0.

²⁰ Koha.net: Çitaku: Artikulli i NYT, vetëm gjysma e së vërtetës dhe me dy vjet vonesë, June 1, 2016, <http://koha.net/?id=27&l=116171> (28/07/2016).

²¹ Koha.net: AFP: Shqipëria dhe Kosova – një ‘front i ri’ i militantëve, May 5, 2016, <http://koha.net/?id=27&l=111804> (28/07/2016).

²² Adem is not his real name, since he didn’t tell his name, because of the fear that he might be arrested.

According to the interview, these preachings were being organized by a charitable Islamic organization, the Islamic Youth. In a comment of the interview, it is said that Kaçanik “has acquired the reputation of the jihadist capital of the Balkans”.²³

The above-mentioned circumstances of the creation of the opinion at the international level, without any doubt affect the image of Kosovo, and this compels the rethinking of the policy of communication of the Government of Kosovo on the issues related to terrorism. Therefore, it is necessary that the governmental institutions of Kosovo should build a strategy of communication with international community and international media, not by denying the fact that some Kosovo citizens are radicalized, but by presenting simultaneously, the achievements, as well as the difficulties, of Kosovo in fighting terrorism. This should also include the possibility of introducing a separate section in the web-pages of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, or even in the main portal of the Government of Kosovo.

Parliamentary Oversight

During the period from March to July of the year 2016, the Parliamentary Commission for Internal Affairs, Security, and the Oversight of the Kosovo Security Force did hold four meetings, which took place on March 30th, April 20th, April 29th, and May 27th.

In the meeting of March 30th, the discussion was focused on the challenges to Kosovo, emerging from the Progress Report for the year 2015, as well as on the National Plan for the implementation of the Stabilisation-Association Agreement. The Head of the Commission, Mr. Fadil Demaku, has proposed to appoint a reporter that would follow the work on the challenges from the Progress Report on Kosovo, and who will, afterwards, report before the Commission, and he proposed Mr. Nuredin Ibishi to be the reporter. Meanwhile, Mr. Ibishi, requested to create a group for this purpose, consisting of three members of the Commission. The members proposed for this group, which would be obliged to follow the work on the challenges arising from the Progress Report on Kosovo, were Mss. Ganimete Musliu and Mr. Qerim Bajrami. The Country Report (the Progress Report, as it was called until the last year) for the year 2015, of the European Commission on Kosovo, points that the members of this Commission, being

²³ Radio Evropa e Lirë: Adoleshenti kosovar: Si u rekrutova nga ISIS-i për të luftuar në Siri?, June 28, 2016, <http://www.evropaelire.org/a/27826560.html> (28/07/2016).

the former soldiers of KLA and of the Kosovo Protection Corps, have close connections with KSF, which impedes “the independent work of evaluation” of this Commission.²⁴ The creation of this reporting group, despite its delay, is an important step towards the fulfillment of the criteria for Kosovo, in its road towards the integration in the EU.

Meanwhile, in the meeting of the Commission of April 20th, 2016, the reports were delivered by two representatives of the State Agency for the Protection of Personal Data: Ruzhdi Jashari, the main state observer, and Bujar Sadiku, the General Director in the State Agency for the Protection of Personal Data. On this occasion, Mr. Jashari has stressed that the enlargement of the internal capacities of the institution, through training, etc., has brought successes of the employees in this institution. Also, this institution is not confronted anymore with difficulties regarding the working space and with logistical issues. Nevertheless, it was mentioned that the number of employees in this institution is still not adequate, and that the field of the protection of personal data itself is very challenging, given that Kosovo has not signed up till now the respective Convention of the European Council. Meanwhile, the deputy, Mss. Ganimete Musliu, raised her concern on the protection of data in the citizens’ monthly bills for utilities, such as those for electricity, garbage, etc. Given that these bills are exposed, Mss. Musliu said, since they are not sent in envelopes, they can be misused. Mr. Jashari stressed that there were inspections made on this issue, and that the KEDS (the electricity company) has already been proceeded to the court, for disregarding the decision for the protection of personal data.²⁵

In the meeting of May 27th, 2016, of the Commission, the reports were delivered by the following representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs: Valdet Hoxha, Deputy-Minister in the Ministry of Internal Affairs; Naim Rexha, Deputy Director of the Kosovo Police; Artan Dreshaj, Director of the Department for Administration of the Communication Systems at the MIA; Dardan Kocani, acting at the Department for European Integrations in MIA, and: Fadil Abdyli, the Chief of the Sector for Investigation and Cyber Crimes in the Kosovo Police.

²⁴ European Commission: Commission Staff Working Document, Kosovo* 2015 Report, Brussels, 10.11.2015, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2015/20151110_report_kosovo.pdf (01/08/2016).

²⁵ Kosovo Assembly: Procesverballi, Komisioni për Punë të Brendshme, Siguri dhe Mbikëqyrjen e Forcës së Sigurisë së Kosovës, 20,04,2016, http://www.kuvendikosoves.org/common/docs/proc/proc_2016_04_20_11_6416_al.pdf, (01/08/2016).

In his report, Mr. Hoxha discussed the Strategy Against the Organized Crime and the Strategy Against Terrorism, which is adopted in 2012, and is applicable until 2017. He stressed that thus far, 75% of the strategy against terrorism has already been implemented, and that it is foreseen that the other part will be implemented in the continuation. On this occasion, he also stressed that the challenges of the implementation of this strategy are largely those pertaining to coordination and communication. Meanwhile, Mr. Naim Rexha, the Deputy Director of the Kosovo Police, reported on the strategy of the police lead by intelligence. He stressed that the notion of the police lead by intelligence, as a contemporary one, is still being considered as new among us, given that it is a replacement of the notion of community policing. He also acknowledged that the beginning of the introduction of this notion in the KP dates back to the year 2010, and that for the moment, the second strategy, the one for the period 2013–2017, is being implemented, as well as that, after 2017, there is an aim of elevating this sectorial strategy into the level of the national strategy.


The National Coordinator of the Strategy for Cyber-Security, Mr. Artan Dreshaj, reported on this sectorial strategy for the period 2016-2019, and in his report he informed the members of the Commission on its major objectives (the protection of critical infrastructure of information, institutional development and international cooperation). Afterwards, Mr. Fadil Avdyli, the Chief of the Sector of Investigation, and Cyber-Crimes, of the Kosovo Police, informed the participants that the most common cases of cyber-crimes are the acts of the misuse of child pornography, penetration into the computer systems, as well as the misuse of the bank credit-cards.²⁶

The trust of Kosovo citizens on the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Kosovo Police, and on the Parliamentary Commission for Security, Internal Affairs, and Kosovo Security Force

The citizens surveyed on May 2016 have had the possibility to express with numbers the level of trust they have on the institutions and their heads, and the numbers available were from 1 to 5, where 1 expresses the lowest level of trust, and 5 the highest.



²⁶ The Kosovo Assembly: Procesverbal, Komisioni për Punë të Brendshme, Siguri dhe Mbikëqyrjen e Forcës së Sigurisë së Kosovës, May 27, 2016, http://www.kuvendikosoves.org/common/docs/proc/proc_2016_05_27_10_6484_al.pdf (02/08/2016).

If we compare the four surveys conducted on May and November of 2015, and February and May of 2016, regarding the general trust on the Ministry of Internal Affairs, we see that in the last survey we have an increase of this trust compared with February 2016. Meanwhile, the Kosovo Police preserves the same trend in the trust of citizens. Also, an increase of trust compared with February 2016 was recorded for the Parliamentary




Commission for Security, Internal Affairs and Kosovo Security Force. Nevertheless, from these three institutions, it is the Kosovo Police which enjoys the highest trust of citizens.


Regarding the trust expressed by ethnicity, the Kosovo Police enjoys the highest trust among the Albanians, and this group is followed by other communities. The Minister of Internal Affairs, on the other hand, enjoys the highest trust among the members of other communities, followed by those of the Albanian community, and then, by the Serbian community. The Parliamentary Commission for Security, Internal Affairs, and the Kosovo Security Force also enjoys the highest trust among other communities, followed by Albanian community, and it has a minimal trust among the members of the Serbian community.



As far as the Albanians resident in the North of Kosovo are concerned, they have expressed the highest trust on Kosovo Police. After the Police comes the Parliamentary Commission on Security, Internal Affairs and Kosovo Security Force, and, among the Albanians resident in the north of Kosovo, the Minister of Internal Affairs enjoys the lowest trust.




Meanwhile, the Serbs resident in South and North, have expressed the highest trust on the Kosovo Police, and on the Minister of Internal Affairs. At the end, the Parliamentary Commission on Security, Internal Affairs and Kosovo Security Force, within this group of Kosovo citizens, enjoys a minimal trust.



Regarding the trust shown in the regions of Kosovo, the Kosovo Police enjoys the highest trust in all of Kosovo, and the highest scores for Kosovo Police were obtained in Ferizaj and Peja. The second regarding the trust of citizens is the Parliamentary Commission on Security, Internal Affairs and Kosovo Security Force, and the Minister of Internal Affairs enjoys the lowest trust expressed in the regions.

As far as trust of ethnicities in the regions is concerned, the Kosovo Police enjoys the highest trust among the other communities, where the highest percentages were obtained in the regions of Ferizaj, Prishtina, and Mitrovica. The trust in Kosovo Police is then followed by the Albanian community, where the highest scores were obtained in Ferizaj, Mitrovica and Prishtina. Meanwhile, the Serbian community has also expressed the highest trust on Kosovo Police, where the highest values were obtained in the regions of Ferizaj and Mitrovica.



2. THE MONITORING OF THE SECTOR OF THE KOSOVO SECURITY FORCE

Introduction

During the reporting period March 15–July 15, 2016, the key public events within the sector of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) were without doubt the issue of the transformation of the KSF into the Armed Forces of Kosovo (AFK), and the relations of Kosovo with NATO.

This section discusses the statements of the Prime Minister of Kosovo, in which he links the transformation of the KSF into the AFK, with the issue of the demarcation of the border with Montenegro, as well as the communication of the Government of Kosovo with the representatives of the Serbian List regarding this transformation. As far as the relations of Kosovo with NATO are concerned, this section will discuss the sections of the Communiqué of the Warsaw Summit of the North Atlantic Council that have to do with Kosovo, a part of which addresses the letter that the Prime Minister Mustafa has send to the Secretary General of NATO, Stoltenberg, in November of the previous year, the cancellation of the participation of the KSF in the largest manoeuvre of the East Wing of NATO after the end of the Cold War, labeled “Anaconda 16”, which took place in Poland, as well as the degradation of the vocabulary of NATO in addressing the leaders of the Kosovo’s state.

This section will also treat the part of the work of the Parliamentary Commission on Security, Internal Affairs and the Oversight of the KSF, which has to do with the Kosovo Security Force. The last part of this section analyzes the trends of the trust of Kosovo citizens on the Minister of the KSF and on the KSF itself.

The Issues of the Transformation of the KSF

- **The Statement of the Prime-Minister Mustafa that Links the Transformation of the KSF with Demarcation**

On July 14th, 2016, Kosovo's Prime-Minister, Mr. Isa Mustafa, posted a message on his Facebook account, after meeting the Assistant Secretary of State of the USA, Mss. Victoria Nuland. In this message he stressed, among others, that "The solution of the problem of borders with our neighbors, in this case with Montenegro, is a very important element of the state sovereignty, which is also linked with the support for the transformation of the KSF into KAF, taking into the consideration that we have to do with two countries, one of which is a member of NATO, and the other aims to become its member. (This does not imply that the transformation will be conducted after the demarcation, but that the transformation was also put, by the American side, in correlation with the demarcation of the border)".²⁷

Furthermore, in an interview for THE Radio Television of Kosovo, on July 13th, 2016, he declared that he was given a clear message that the transformation of the KSF, and the creation of the Kosovo Armed Forces are closely related to the demarcation, and that "Neither the United States of America, nor NATO, will accept the establishment of an army, which will afterwards have border problems with a neighboring state".²⁸ On reaction to this, the deputy of Vetëvendosje, Mr. Rexhep Selimi, said that he considers these statements of the Prime Minister Mustafa as utterly false, by adding that the issue of the demarcation has no connection whatsoever with the transformation of the KSF into an army, and he qualified all this as an invention of the Government.²⁹

On the other hand, the Statement of the Embassy of the USA in Prishtina, delivered on the visit of the Assistant Secretary Nuland to Kosovo, states, inter alia, that she has emphasized that the Government should address important challenges, among others, the Euro-Atlantic integrations, including here the

²⁷ <https://www.facebook.com/IsaMustafaKS/?fref=ts>, July 14, 2016, 09.36 PM.

²⁸ Gazetaexpress, Mustafa: Demarkacioni, kusht edhe për formimin e FAK-ut, July 13, 2016, <http://www.gazetaexpress.com/lajme/mustafa-demarkacioni-kusht-edhe-per-formimin-e-fak-ut-video-226361/>.

²⁹ Koha Ditore: Kundërshtohet ashpër deklarata e Mustafës që lidh demarkacionin me FAK-un, July 14, 2016, <http://time.ikub.al/16-07-14-Mustafa-zbulon-temat-bisedes-me-nensekretaren-Nuland/Kundershtohet-ashper-deklarata-e-Mustafes-qe-lidh-demarkacionin-me-FAK-un-video-.aspx>.

demarcation with Montenegro, as well as the dialogue with Serbia.³⁰ Meanwhile, the US Ambassador Delawie, in his speech in the roundtable on the issue of demarcation with Montenegro, has connected the demarcation agreement between Kosovo and Montenegro with the strengthening of the stability in the Balkans, by adding that this will bring progress in the movement of the region towards the Euro-Atlantic integrations.³¹

For an insightful analysis of the aforementioned statements, we should firstly take into the consideration that the missions of armed forces in democratic countries are primarily concerned with the defense of the sovereignty and the citizens from possible foreign aggressions, and that they don't have to do almost at all with the defense of the border (except for the coastal guards). Furthermore, we should also stress that the countries of the Western Balkans, which aspire the membership in the European Union, including Kosovo and Montenegro, are obliged to implement the instructions of the EU for the Integrated Border Management,³² which are also a part of the "Acquis Communautaire" (REGULATION (EC) No 562/2006), and these instructions do not foresee any concrete role for the military in the border management of these countries. After all, these instructions are being implemented by the Government of Kosovo itself, through the application of the National Strategy of the Republic of Kosovo for the Integrated Border Management.³³

Therefore, we can conclude that the issue of the demarcation with Montenegro, in its operational aspect, has no direct connections with the issue of the transformation of the KSF into the KAF, because of the simple fact that the armed forces do not have any concrete role either in the management of the borders, or in their defense. However, the solution of the border issues with Podgorica, will undoubtedly increase the regional stability, and, thus, it will eliminate the possibility of any conditioning that Montenegro, as a NATO member country, could use against Kosovo in its road towards the integration in NATO, and this is the only light in which, the linkage between the transformation of the KSF into the KAF with the demarcation with Montenegro, can be understood.

³⁰ US Embassy to Kosovo, Statement on Assistant Secretary Nuland's Visit to Kosovo, July 10, 2016, <http://pristina.usembassy.gov/st-07102016.html> .

³¹ US Embassy to Kosovo, Ambassador Delawie's Remarks at the Border Demarcation Roundtable, http://pristina.usembassy.gov/border_demarcation.html .

³² European Commission: Guidelines for Integrated Border Management in the Western Balkans, January 2007, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/financial_assistance/cards/publications/ibm_guidelines_en.pdf .

³³ The Government of Kosovo, Strategjia Kombëtare e Republikës së Kosovës për Menaxhimin e Integruar të Kufirit, http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/repository/docs/Strategjia_Kombetare_per_MIK_2013-2018.pdf .

- **The Beginning of the Communication with the Serbian List**

In the reporting of April 29th, 2016, of the Minister of the Kosovo Security Force, Mr. Haki Demolli, before the Parliamentary Commission on Internal Affairs, Security and the Kosovo Security Force, the fact that the communication with the Serbian List on the transformation of the KSF has begun, was made public.³⁴

On this occasion, Minister Demolli communicated that he has had a personal meeting with the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Branimir Stojanović, and the Minister for Local Administration from the Serbian List, Mr. Lubomir Marić. In this meeting the Deputy Prime Minister Stojanović has expressed his concern that the Serbian List has remained uninformed on the development of the process of the transformation. After this, the Ministry of the KSF has delivered to Minister Marić the complete documentation pertaining to the process of the transformation (the Constitutional Amendments, the Draft Law on the Transformation of the KSF). Thereafter, another meeting took place, which didn't yield any concrete results, except for the commitment of the Serbian List to consult the issue with the experts of this political subject. The third meeting was organized in a broader format, and the its participants were President Thaçi, Prime Minister Mustafa, Deputy Prime Minister Stojanović, Minister Demolli, Minister Jevtić, Minister Marić, and the Commander of the KSF, General Rama. In this meeting, the finding of a solution for voting the transformation of the KSF into the Kosovo Armed Forces was discussed.³⁵ Furthermore, the deputy of the Serbian List, Mr. Bojan Mitić has requested for these issues to be discussed as well with the representatives of the Serbian List in the Kosovo Assembly, given that this List is exactly the one that should support the transformation of the KSF,³⁶ in order to make the creation of the KAF possible.

The reporting of Minister Demolli raises a very important question: why the Government of Kosovo, which is presenting the transformation of the KSF as a priority of its own ever since the previous legislation, did not have so far any other meetings with the representatives of the Serbian List, given that their vote is indispensable for constitutional changes which will enable the creation of the Kosovo

³⁴ Procesverbali i Mbledhjes së 29 të Komisionit Parlamentar për Punë të Brendshme, Siguri dhe Mbikëqyrje të Forcës së Sigurisë, April 29, 2016, http://www.kuvendikosoves.org/common/docs/proc/proc_2016_04_29_10_6436_al.pdf.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

Armed Forces? The preceding lack of any consultations with the representatives of the Serbian List on this issue, will only hinder the process of the transformation of the KSF, given that this process is not, simply, an issue of voting, but, also, an issue of the mutual trust, without which the probability for the success of this process is small indeed, and particularly given the impact and the opposing view of Belgrade.

On the other hand, the fact that it will be very difficult to obtain the support of the Serbian List for the transformation of the KSF, is entirely evident. Thus, the ex-Minister Jablanović has recently used an aggravating vocabulary on this issue. At the end of May 2016, he declared that “by voting the Army of Kosovo, we will spit on the grave of every soldier and police officer killed or wounded in Kosovo”, by adding that the Resolution 1244 of the UN SC is in power, according to which, the only armed formation in Kosovo is KFOR, with the possibility for the return of the members of the Serbian Army.³⁷ Meanwhile, on June 8th, 2016, the deputy Nenad Rašić, expressed his distrust that the Serbian List will vote for the creation of the KAF, given that Serbia considers that this is not in the interest of the Serbs of Kosovo.³⁸

Immediately after this statement, more precisely, only a day later, on June 9th, in an interview for the RTK, the Prime Minister of Kosovo, Mr. Isa Mustafa reacted to this: “I think that Rašić is sometimes exaggerating with some of his assessments, given that there is no case in which Vučić will decide for the Armed Forces, it is our western allies and friends who will decide, those who have helped us until now to create this KSF that we have, and in a manner in which we have created it, a KSF that resembles the best armies in this part of the Balkans, but, also, in the Europe, and which is ready to transform itself into an Armed Force without even a single problem”.³⁹

It is clear that the fact mentioned by the Prime Minister Mustafa, that the Western countries will be those that will take the final decision on the transformation of the KSF into the KAF, is fully accurate. Nevertheless, it is also clear that, in the meantime, this transformation is very effectively being blocked

³⁷ Koha Ditore: “Themelimi i FAK-ut është pështymje në varret e ushtarëve serb në Kosovë” <http://koha.net/?id=27&l=114706>.

³⁸ Koha Ditore, “Rashiq thotë se serbët nuk do ta votojnë FAK-un” June 8, 2016, <http://koha.net/?id=27&l=117438>.

³⁹ See: ‘Mustafa: Rashiq po e tepron, Vuçiq nuk vendos për transformimin e FSK-së’, at [http://www.gazetaexpress.com/lajme/mustafa-rashic-po-e-tepron-vucic-nuk-vendos-per-transformimin-e-fsk-se-video-211029/?utm_source=ëebbsite&utm_medium=RA&utm_content=mUSTAFA,fsk,rashic,Kosova,Vucic,Serbia&utm_campaign=InsideArticle&past_aid=](http://www.gazetaexpress.com/lajme/mustafa-rashic-po-e-tepron-vucic-nuk-vendos-per-transformimin-e-fsk-se-video-211029/?utm_source=ëebbsite&utm_medium=RA&utm_content=mUSTAFA,fsk,rashic,Kosova,Vucic,Serbia&utm_campaign=InsideArticle&past_aid=,), June 9, 2016.

by Serbia, through the Serbian List. If it was not for this blockade of Serbia and of the Serbian List, the KSF would have been transformed into the KAF immediately. There is no doubt that the respective Western countries would like to see Kosovo with the Army of its own, but they are requesting for this to be done with the respective constitutional changes and with the participation of Kosovo Serbs in this process. And this was again made perfectly clear by the Deputy Assistant of the US Secretary of Defense, Mr. Michael Carpenter, in the meeting with Minister Demolli, on July 10th, 2016, in Prishtina.⁴⁰

From all that was said above, we can see clearly that the opening of a genuine dialogue with the Serbian List is necessary, and that this dialogue should be done with their representatives in the Government, as well as with their deputies at the Assembly of Kosovo. The first step in this process, which is already belated, is the building of confidence and of transparency, despite the diametrically opposite views, given that this is the only way for achieving the solution for this issue.

The Relations of Kosovo with NATO

On November 19th, 2015, the Prime Minister of Kosovo has send a letter to the Secretary General of NATO, Mr. Jens Stoltenberg, through which he requested for Kosovo to establish an individualized and cooperative relationship with NATO, which could include these elements:⁴¹ a) Regular political dialogue between NATO and Kosovo at the highest political and ministerial levels; b) The establishment of a Kosovo liason with the NATO headquarters in Brussels; c) Assistance, assesment, and development of an individualized cooperation program to form the basis for strengthened cooperation with NATO; d) Upgrading of the NATO-s civilian and military presence in Kosovo, and, specifically, the consolidation of the NLAT (NATO-s Liason Advisory Team) and of the NAT (NATO-s Advisory Team) into a single integrated team; e) Public Diplomacy Division (PDD) co-sponsorship grants for Kosovo's institutions, NGOs, universities, think-tanks, and other pertinent civil society organizations on peace and security-related issues; f) Access to NATO-s programs and tools, such as the Science for Peace and Security and Building Integrity Programs, which can enhance cooperation and dialogue with NATO and its partners based on scientific research innovation and knowledge exchange with Kosovo.

⁴⁰ FSK: Në MFSK ministri Haki Demolli priti Zëvendës Asistentin e Sekretarit të Mbrojtjes së SHBA-ve, Dr Michael Carpenter, June 10, 2016, <http://mksf-ks.org/?page=1,24,1709#.V6MDcU0kqM8>.

⁴¹ The letter of the Prime Minister of Kosovo, Mr. Isa Mustafa, addressed to Mr. Jens Stoltenberg, the Secretary General of NATO, November 19, 2015, Ref: 192/2015.

The official response to this concrete initiative of Kosovo on cooperation with NATO was expected to be given in the Warsaw Summit of NATO that took place on July 8-9th in Poland. However, in the Communique of the Summit, issued by the heads of the states and governments that participated in the meeting of the North-Atlantic Council, there was no such response to the initiative of Kosovo, which was postponed for the December meeting of the Foreign Ministers.⁴²

Despite the fact that this Communique was welcomed by President Thaçi and Prime Minister Mustafa, the hopes that NATO will make any larger move towards the addressing of the requests of the Government of Kosovo are not high. The major obstacle for the advancement of the relations between Kosovo and NATO in the Warsaw Summit was the opposing attitude of Spain.⁴³

Furthermore, despite the fact that the KSF was invited, on the initiative of its supporters,⁴⁴ in the largest military maneuvers of the East Wing of NATO after the Cold War, named “Anaconda 16”, which took place in the first half of June 2016 in Poland,⁴⁵ its participation was canceled, again, because of the opposition of Spain,⁴⁶ which indicates clearly the consistency of the opposing policy of Madrid towards the advancement of the relations of Kosovo with NATO. Thus, as a consequence of the opposing attitude of Spain, there is little probability that NATO’s approach towards Kosovo will change until the December meeting of the Foreign Ministers of NATO.⁴⁷

There is also a disturbing fact that the vocabulary that NATO is using in addressing the Kosovo leaders according to their functions has degraded. During the time when Kosovo was under the administration

⁴² Point 89: “... the Alliance will continue to support the development of the security organisations in Kosovo, including through the NATO advisory team on the ground and in accordance with Allied decisions, and will keep the nature of further support under review. We note Kosovo’s request for an enhanced relationship with NATO and will respond no later than the December Foreign Ministerial on ways to further develop our support.”, Warsaw Summit Communiqué, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8-9 July 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm?selectedLocale=en .

⁴³ From a conversation with a high official of NATO in Kosovo, Prishtina, July 18, 2016.

⁴⁴ From a conversation with a high official of the Kosovo Government, July 2016.

⁴⁵ Guardian: Nato countries begin largest war game in eastern Europe since cold war, June 6, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/06/nato-launches-largest-war-game-in-eastern-europe-since-cold-war-anaconda-2016> .

⁴⁶ From a conversation with a high official of NATO in Kosovo, Prishtina, July 18, 2016.

⁴⁷ From a conversation with a high official of NATO in Kosovo, Prishtina, July 18, 2016.

of UNMIK, and from the Declaration of Independence of Kosovo until the end of 2011, in the communiqués of NATO, the leaders of Kosovo were being addressed according to their state functions, and, from the year 2012, they are being addressed only with their name, and by mentioning the fact that they are from Kosovo.⁴⁸ Thus, while, for instance, in the previous communications of NATO, President Rugova was being addressed as “Mr. Ibrahim Rugova, **the President** of Kosovo”, or, the previous Prime Minister of Kosovo, Hashim Thaçi was being addressed as “Mr. Hashim Thaçi, **the Prime Minister** of Kosovo”, now, the President Hashim Thaçi and the Prime Minister Isa Mustafa are being addressed as “Hashim Thaçi **of** Kosovo” and “Isa Mustafa **of** Kosovo”. Such a public treatment of Kosovo indicates the internal contradictions on the issue of building of its relations with NATO.

Nevertheless, it is interesting to add that this degradation in the addressing of the Kosovar officials by NATO has started after the action of the Special Unit of Kosovo Police – ROSU, in the North of Kosovo, in July 2011, an action that was conducted without the previous information of KFOR and NATO.

The Oversight of the Parliamentary Commission on Security, Internal Affairs and the Oversight of the KSF

During this reporting period, the Parliamentary Commission on Security, Internal Affairs, and the Oversight of the KSF did hold four meetings. The issues pertaining to KSF were discussed only in the meeting of April 24th, 2016, and in this meeting, the Minister of the Ministry of the Kosovo Security Force, Mr. Haki Demolli, delivered his report. Meanwhile, the other three meetings of the Commission were treated in the report provided above, on the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

In the reporting of April 24th, 2016, the Minister of the Ministry of the Kosovo Security Force, Mr. Haki Demolli, has provided information on the visits and meetings that he has had in the United States of America. He emphasized that the issues of cooperation on security issues were discussed in these meetings, and that the key topics were the vision of the Ministry of the KSF, the regional cooperation, and, in connection to this, the interest of Kosovo for becoming a member in the regional initiatives on security, such as the Adriatic Chapter A-5, as well as the membership in other security mechanisms.

⁴⁸ See the section News Room of NATO’s website, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_room.htm .

Minister Demolli also informed that the issues discussed also involved the cooperation of the KSF with NATO, as well as the possibilities for the establishment of a liaison office of Kosovo in NATO.

The process of the transformation of the KSF into the KAF was also an issue of the talks of the Minister of KSF with US officials, and Minister Demolli stressed that the advisory teams of NATO are also included in the process of this transformation.

As far as the inclusion of the NATO-s Advisory Team (NAT) in the process of transformation is concerned, this issue was discussed in detail in the Observer Nr. 3, Volume I of KIPRED, and, according to an interview with NAT officials, that issue of Observer has emphasized that “neither from these advisory teams of NATO has a mandate to support the transformation of the KSF into the KAF”.⁴⁹ The fact that NAT is not involved in the process of the transformation of the KSF into the KAF, was also publicly stated by the Director of NAT, Mr. Dominic Braithwaite, in a meeting that took place in the Ministry of the Kosovo Security Force, in the public hearing on the discussion of the Draft Law for changing and amending the laws pertaining to Kosovo’s Armed Forces.⁵⁰

During his report, Minister Demolli announced that he also had meetings with the representatives of the Serbian community in the Kosovo Assembly regarding the transformation of the KSF into KAF, and he informed that a department was created, which will oversee the transformation during a ten-year period, as well as that the increase of the personnel, of the budget, of the infrastructure, and of the training process, has already taken place.

During the meeting of the Commission, the deputy Mr. Nuredin Ibishi raised the issue of the Law on Procurement, by adding that there were some misuses in buying of cars, which were identified in the publications of the civil society organizations. Therefore, he encouraged the efforts for overcoming this situation, in order to don’t have any further critiques regarding this issue. In his response, Minister Demolli said that, due to the change of the Law on Procurement, a need was created to put in power a

⁴⁹ KIPRED: The Kosovo Security Sector Observer, Volume I, Nr.3, March 2016, pg: 20, http://www.kipred.org/repository/docs/OBSERVERI - VOL I - N03. Shqip_Final_147110.pdf .

⁵⁰ The declaration of Mr. Dominic Braithwaite, the Director of NAT, in the public hearing during the discussion on the Draftlaw for changing and amending the laws pertaining to the Armed Forces of Kosovo, that took place in the Ministry of the Kosovo Security Force, was: “NAT is not involved in the process of the transformation of the KSF into the KAF, we are here in the role of the observer”. June 1, 2016.

particular regulation, and that, meanwhile, regarding the means that have something special, and which have to do with military issues, we should follow with negotiating procedures, without opening tenders, indeed, without bypassing the laws.

The deputy Mr. Anton Quni raised the issue of the stumble in the development of the personnel, as well as the one of nomination in the high positions of the KSF. On this issue, Minister Demolli declared that the situation that he found is worrisome, and that after the new commander of the KSF was appointed, he insisted that the advancement of the military personnel should move in accordance with the regulations on the development of career, and that all the members of the personnel should be treated equally.

Yet another concern, one which is being repeated in each from the meetings of this Commission, is the issue of the members of the Bosniak community in the KSF. The deputy from the Bosniak community, Mr. Qerim Bajrami, requested from the Minister to have the records on the members of the Bosniak Community, given that he doubts that these can be manipulated.


Regarding the issue on whether there might have been any abuses, Minister Demolli stressed that there might have been, given that this is the situation in which he found the Ministry, but he also stressed that he will request from the KSF services to provide the names, surnames and addresses of the officers and members from the minorities, in order to ascertain the possible abuses, and that there will be a proper information on this issue.⁵¹

The Trust of Kosovo Citizens on the Ministry of Kosovo Security Force and on the Kosovo Security Force



The citizens surveyed in May 2016 have had the opportunity to express the level of their trust on the institutions and institutional leaders with numbers from 1 to 5, where 1 expresses the lowest level of trust, and 5 the highest.

⁵¹ The Kosovo Assembly: Procesverbal, Komisioni për Punë të Brendshme, Siguri dhe Mbikëqyrjen e Forcës së Sigurisë së Kosovës, April 29, 2016, http://www.kuvendikosoves.org/common/docs/proc/proc_2016_04_29_10_6436_al.pdf

As far as the general trends of trust of Kosovo citizens is concerned, we can see that the Kosovo Security Force enjoys the highest trust, and that, since February 2016, the trust on the KSF has recorded a slight fall. Meanwhile, the Minister of the KSF enjoys lower trust than KSF, but this trust has shown a small increase when compared with the value recorded on February 2016.




Regarding the trust according to ethnicity, the highest level of trust on the Kosovo Security Force was shown by Albanians, followed by the members of other communities, and that the trust of the Serbian community on KSF is minimal. It should be stressed that, compared to February 2016, the trust of the Serbian community has increased slightly, where the value added was 0.3. Meanwhile, the Minister of the Kosovo Security Force enjoys the highest trust among other communities, followed by the Albanians. Also, the Minister enjoys a minimal level of trust among the Serbian community, despite the fact that this trust has shown a slight increase, 0.5, compared to February 2016.





Among the Albanians resident in the North of Kosovo, the highest trust continues to be expressed for the Kosovo Security Force, and this is followed by an average trust on the Minister of the Kosovo Security Force.

Meanwhile, as far as the Serbs resident in the South and North of Kosovo is concerned, the results show the continuation of the trend of minimal trust on the Minister of the Security Force and on the KSF itself, except for the Serbs of the South who have a very small difference of the trust.



Regarding the trust by regions, the Kosovo Security Force enjoys the highest trust in general compared with the trust on the Minister of the KSF. KSF has the highest trust in the municipalities of Ferizaj, Prizren and of Prishtina. Meanwhile, the Minister of the KSF has a lower trust than KSF in every municipality, and the trust on the Minister has also the highest values in the municipalities of Ferizaj, Prizren and Prishtina.



3. THE MONITORING OF THE SECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Introduction

During the reporting period from March 15th up to July 15th, 2016, there was not even a single public event recorded on the sector of the intelligence and of the Security Council of Kosovo. And, the very absence of any news regarding these institutions, will be the topic of discussion of this section.

Thus, in this section we will discuss the lack of any meeting of the Kosovo Security Council, as well as the non-reporting of this Council before the Parliamentary Commission on Internal Affairs, Security and the Oversight of the KSF.

Also, this section will treat the work of the Parliamentary Commission on Intelligence, and it will analyze the trends of the trust of the Kosovo citizens on the Kosovo's Agency of Intelligence, its Director, and on the Parliamentary Commission on Intelligence.

Kosovo Security Council

During the year 2016, the holding of the regular meetings of the Kosovo's Security Council has stumbled, despite of the fact that these meetings, according to the respective law, should take place at least once in three months.⁵² The only meeting of the Kosovo's Security Council that was held during this year was the one of January 9th, 2016, and the only thing that was done after that meeting was the issuance of a statement, which denounced the escalation of violence in the protests organized by opposition parties in Prishtina.⁵³

Furthermore, the fact that the Security Council did not hold any meeting during this time period is worrisome for the entire comprehensive development of the security sector in Kosovo. The National Program, of March 2016, for the Implementation of the Stabilization-Association Agreement of the Kosovo Government, foresees the composition and the approval of the Kosovo's National Security,⁵⁴ on which the composition of the Defense Strategy depends, and a decision for this should be taken by the Kosovo Security Council.

On the other hand, according to the plan for the year 2016 of the Commission for Internal Affairs, Security and the Oversight of the Kosovo Security Force, the Annual Report of the Kosovo Security Council must have been discussed in April, which would have been the fulfillment of the first legal obligation of this institution towards the parliamentary oversight.⁵⁵ However, the discussion of the Annual Report of the Security Council was not put on the agenda of the Commission up till now. Thus, the Security Council continues to remain the only institution without parliamentary oversight, and in full contradiction with the Kosovo's legal framework.

The failure of the Kosovo Security Council to hold regular meetings, and the absence of its parliamentary oversight, remain, undoubtedly, among the gravest difficulties of democratic governance and

⁵² Article 5.1. The Law on the Establishment of the Security Council of Kosovo, Nr. 03/L-050, March 13, 2008.

⁵³ The Statement of the Security Council of Kosovo, January 9, 2016, http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/index.php/en/repository/docs/Strategjia_per_parandalimin_dhe_eliminimin_e_punes_se_femijeve_ne_Kosove_2011-2016.pdf?page=1,9,5501.

⁵⁴ The Point 1.1.6. The National Program for the Implementation of the Stabilization-Association Agreement, March 2016, http://www.mei-ks.net/repository/docs/1_pkzmsa_miratuar_nga_kuvendi_final_.pdf.

⁵⁵ Article 9. Article 5.1. The Law on the Establishment of the Kosovo Security Council, Nr. 03/L-050, 13 mars 2008.

management of Kosovo's security sector, and these are institutional responsibilities of the Prime Minister Mustafa, given that this institution functions under his liability.

Parliamentary Oversight

During the period March–July, 2016, the Parliamentary Commission for the Oversight of the Kosovo Intelligence Agency gathered three times.⁵⁶

On April 27th, according to the agenda published on the official web-site of the Kosovo Assembly, the challenges from the Progress Report on Kosovo for the year 2015, as well as from the National Plan for the Implementation of the Stabilization-Association Agreement, were addressed. Regarding this issue, there were no public announcements for media by the Head of this Commission, nor from any from its members.

On June 24th, the agenda consisted of the reporting by the General Inspector of the Kosovo's Intelligence Agency, Mr. Shkelzen Sopjani. Meanwhile, the third and the last meeting during the period March–July 2016, took place on July 12th, and its agenda, among others, included the implementation of the working plan of the Commission for the spring session 2016, a plan which, despite the continuous recommendations by KIPRED, is not made public yet.


As mentioned in the previous reports of the Kosovo Security Sector Observer of KIPRED, despite the legal limitations, and in accordance with the existing laws and regulations, the Commission for the Oversight of the KIA has sufficient space to be more transparent, by opening some from its meetings for the media and for the public opinion, or, at least, by issuing press communiques, once after these meetings are finished.

However, the Commission continues to keep its work fully confidential, despite a very low trust that the intelligence sector of Kosovo enjoys among the Kosovo citizens.


⁵⁶ The Commission for the Oversight of the KIA, 'Meetings', <http://www.kuvendikosoves.org/?cid=1,110,131>.

The Trust of Kosovo Citizens on the Kosovo Intelligence Agency, on the Director of the Kosovo Intelligence Agency, and on the Parliamentary Commission for the Oversight of the Kosovo Intelligence Agency

The citizens surveyed on May 2016 have had the possibility to express the level of their trust on the institutions, and on the institutional leaders of the intelligence sector with numbers from 1 to 5, where the number 1 expresses the lowest level of trust, and 5 the highest.




If we compare the surveys of the months July 2015, November 2015, February 2016, and May 2016, regarding the general trust on the Kosovar Intelligence Agency, we see that in the last survey we have a small increase of the trust compared with that of the February 2016th survey. Also, we notice a small increase of trust on the Director of the Kosovar Intelligence Agency, and on the Parliamentary Commission for the Oversight of KIA.




As far as the trust expressed by ethnicities is concerned, the members of other communities show the highest trust on the Kosovar Intelligence Agency, on the Director of KIA, and on the Parliamentary Commission on KIA, followed by the members of Albanian community. Meanwhile, the trust of the members of the Serbian community on these institutions is minimal.


The Albanians resident in the North of Kosovo have the highest trust on the Parliamentary Commission on KIA, then, the second, according to trust comes the Kosovar Intelligence Agency itself, and the trust on the Director of the Kosovar Intelligence Agency is smaller.




Meanwhile, the members of the Serbian community in the North and South of Kosovo do not trust almost at all on the above mentioned institutions, and in this trend there is no considerable difference depending on the parts of the territory of Kosovo in which they live.



When we look at the regions of Kosovo, we see that the Kosovar Intelligence Agency enjoys the highest trust in all of Kosovo, and that while the highest values of trust were recorded in Ferizaj, Prizren and Prishtina, the lowest one is recorded in Mitrovica. The Director of the Kosovar Agency of Intelligence, and the Parliamentary Commission on KIA enjoy equal trust, and the highest values of this trust are recorded in Prizren and Ferizaj, and the lowest in Mitrovica.



Regarding the trust on the Kosovar Intelligence Agency, on its Director, and on the Parliamentary Commission on KIA, based on regions and ethnicities of Kosovo, the Serbian community does not have almost any trust on them. Meanwhile, the members of other communities, together with those of the Albanian community, in general, have higher trust on these institutions, and this can be noticed in almost all the regions of Kosovo. Another interesting fact is that other communities in the region of Ferizaj have shown the highest trust on these three institutions.



THE KOSOVO POLICE AND THE INTERPOL (NON)COOPERATION AND THE PROSPECTS FOR MEMBERSHIP

Introduction

In the fighting of crimes which are increasingly becoming less confined within the state borders, the international police cooperation is increasingly becoming a necessity, rather than a choice of sovereign states. INTERPOL is without doubt the largest international police organization in the world; it was established formally in the year 1923, with the name International Commission of the Criminal Police, and it took its recent name in 1956. The cooperation of Kosovo with this international police organization was established indirectly in October 2002, through the Memorandum of Understanding between UNMIK and Interpol.⁵⁷ According to this Memorandum, the UNMIK has the status of an intergovernmental organization (international entity), and it also includes the provisions that are linked with the cooperation of UNCIVIPOL (the UN Civil Police), as well as the rules that govern the access of the intergovernmental organizations – international entities, to the databases and communication networks of Interpol. Within Interpol, the UNMIK, in its legal capacity of an intergovernmental organization, enjoys the status of an observer.⁵⁸

On the other hand, despite the fact that more than eight years have passed since the Declaration of Independence of Kosovo, the relations of Kosovo Police with INTERPOL continue to be managed through UNMIK. The operational cooperation with INTERPOL, in terms of efforts to increase the domestic capacities, was reinforced with the creation, in 2011, of the International Law Enforcement Coordination Unit (ILECU) within the Kosovo Police.⁵⁹ However, despite the fact that Kosovo has build the capacities that are necessary for becoming a member of INTERPOL,⁶⁰ there was no progress in the process of its entrance into this organization, at the same time when, on the other hand, the political tensions

⁵⁷ The Resolution AG-2002-RES-10, Memorandum of Understanding with the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), The ICPO-Interpol General Assembly, meeting in Yaoundé, 21-24 October, in its 71st session.

⁵⁸ Article. 8. b. General Regulations, Interpol, [I/GREG/GA/1956(2014)], 2014.

⁵⁹ Decision of the Government of the Republic of Kosovo Nr. 04/02, for the establishment of the International Law Enforcement Coordination Unit within the General Directorate of Kosovo, March 2, 2011.

⁶⁰ EULEX Project to support Kosovo in their efforts to become an INTERPOL member, March 18, 2015.

between the Kosovo Government and UNMIK, regarding the size and the role of the latter, are increasing.

The aim of this work is to briefly examine the cooperation of Kosovo with INTERPOL through UNMIK, that is, the challenges and obstacles that characterize this cooperation, the difficulties that have emerged, and can emerge, regarding the membership of Kosovo in INTERPOL, as well as to provide several recommendations on these problems.

THE (NON)COOPERATION OF THE KOSOVO POLICE WITH INTERPOL THROUGH UNMIK

The capacity of Kosovo Police for international cooperation was consolidated with the creation of the International Law Enforcement Cooperation Unit (ILECU) within the Kosovo Police,⁶¹ as well as with the Memorandum of Understanding for the coordination and support of ILECU, among the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Finance and State Prosecutor,⁶² which was opened in June 2011.

The establishment of ILECU's in the countries of the Western Balkans (initially without Kosovo) was presented at the end of 2008 with the support of the European Commission, and the objectives here, were both, the creation of an efficient mechanism for cooperation in the Enforcement of the International Law, and the increase of regional cooperation in this field.⁶³ Despite the fact that the establishment of ILECU's was initially focused on the Western Balkans, as part of the programs of EU for policies of good neighborhood, these were created, or are being created, in Moldavia, Georgia, and Ukraine as well.⁶⁴

The Directorate for International Cooperation in the Field of the Law Enforcement (ILECU) functions within the General Directorate of the Kosovo Police, and it is also responsible for the operational aspects

⁶¹ Decision of the Government of the Republic of Kosovo Nr. 04/02 for the establishment of the International Law Enforcement Coordination Unit within the General Directorate of Kosovo, March 2, 2011.

⁶² Memorandum of Understanding for the coordination and support provided for the International Law Enforcement Coordination Unit (ILECU), Government of the Republic of Kosovo, Prishtina, April 20, 2011.

⁶³ RCC Press Release: "Establishment of international law enforcement coordination units in Western Balkans launched in Vienna today", December 9, 2012.

⁶⁴ Criminal Intelligence Service of Austria: "International Law Enforcement Units", 2015.

of police cooperation with INTERPOL through UNMIK. There are 18 persons employed in ILECU, and this unit carries out its duties without any break, for 24 hours a day, and seven days a week.⁶⁵

However, the operational relations of Kosovo's ILECU with international institutions for the enforcement of the international law (INTERPOL, EUROPOL, FRONTEX, etc.), are not the same with those of the other countries of the region, given that the communication and the joint operation with these organizations is carried out through the Office of INTERPOL in UNMIK, EULEX,⁶⁶ as well as through the Police Attache of Italy in Kosovo, who is the focal point for cooperation with EUROPOL.⁶⁷

The cooperation of the Kosovo Police with INTERPOL through UNMIK is confronted with difficulties, which are largely of procedural nature, but there are also political ones. Despite its juridical status of international entity, the INTERPOL's Office in UNMIK, in a way, plays the role of a Central National Bureau, at the same time when Kosovo's ILECU in reality functions as a subordinated agency in the communication and operability between Prishtina and the INTERPOL's headquarters in Lyon.

The key element which is perceived as a difficulty, and a source of distrust in the Kosovo Police, in its relations with the INTERPOL's Office in UNMIK, is the fact that this office, ever since it was established, was governed by police officials from Russia and Ukraine, two from the countries that have not recognized independence of Kosovo,⁶⁸ and this is particularly exacerbated by the fact that there always is possibility for the police data to be misused politically by Russia. Lately, the cooperation of the political part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs with UNMIK was frozen, after an internal order of the Interior Minister, Mr. Skender Hyseni.⁶⁹ Furthermore, the general relations of the Kosovo Government with UNMIK, can now be qualified as aggravated and tense, after the statement of the Foreign Minister, Hoxhaj, that UNMIK is an extension of the Russian influence in Kosovo.⁷⁰

⁶⁵ An interview with Major Veton Elshani, the Director of the Directorate for the International Cooperation in the Field of the Law Enforcement (ILECU), June 7, 2016.

⁶⁶ An interview with Major Veton Elshani, the Director of the Directorate for the International Cooperation in the Field of the Law Enforcement (ILECU), June 7, 2016.

⁶⁷ An interview with a high UNMIK official, May 12, 2016.

⁶⁸ An interview with Mss. Shqipe Mjekiqi, High Advisor of the Interior Minister, May 30, 2016; with Major Veton Elshani, Director of the Directorate for the Coordination of the Enforcement of the International Law, June 7, 2016; and, with Major Faton Makolli, Director of the Directorate for Anti-Terrorism of the Kosovo Police, June 8, 2016.

⁶⁹ An interview with a high UNMIK official, May 12, 2016.

⁷⁰ TV Dukagjini, Personale – Enver Hoxhaj, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Du6boGNbS1s>, June 16, 2016.

On the other hand, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) considers that the INTERPOL's Office in UNMIK has had more benefits from the data of the Kosovo Police, than vice-versa.⁷¹ The Kosovo Police responds to every request for data by the INTERPOL's Office in UNMIK, at the same time when it has no direct access to databases, to reports and analyses of crimes, as well as to the evaluations on crime areas⁷² for particular regions of INTERPOL.⁷³ The impossibility of access of Kosovo Police into the databases and reports and analyses of INTERPOL, presents a major handicap for Kosovo in fighting the crimes, as well as in efforts for their prevention.

Despite the fact that UNMIK evaluates that the Directorate of Anti-Terrorism of the Kosovo Police is very well prepared in operational terms, and that its personnel has high analytical skills,⁷⁴ the Kosovo Police considers that it didn't have any particular benefit from the INTERPOL's Office of UNMIK in the fight against terrorism.⁷⁵ Here we should stress the fact that, despite the fact that Kosovo is being confronted with the danger of terrorism for many years, only quite recently, that is, before several months, the INTERPOL's Office of UNMIK has provided the Kosovo Police with a list of 5–6 thousand persons connected to terrorism, and that this list is already incorporated into the Kosovo Police databases.⁷⁶

An essential issue of the cooperation between Kosovo Police and the INTERPOL Office in UNMIK concerns the persons chased for criminal acts, whose data are published, or are requested to be published, into the INTERPOL's databases, and particularly those that fit into the categories "Red⁷⁷ Notice⁷⁸" and "Red Difussion".⁷⁹ In these terms, the problems largely pertain to the updating and

⁷¹ An interview with Major Fatos Makolli, the Director of the Directorate for Anti-Terrorism of the Kosovo Police, June 8, 2016.

⁷² INTERPOL Crime Areas, <http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas>.

⁷³ An interview with Mss. Shqipe Mjekiqi, May 30, 2016.

⁷⁴ An interview with a high UNMIK official, May 12, 2016.

⁷⁵ An interview with Major Fatos Makolli, June 8, 2016.

⁷⁶ An interview with Major Veton Elshani, June 7, 2016

⁷⁷ The definition of INTERPOL for the objective of the "Red Notice" – The Red Notices are published upon the request of a Central National Bureau, or of an international entity which has the power of investigating or prosecution in the criminal issues, with the goal of searching for the location of the persons investigated, and of detention, arrest, or restriction of their movement, with the aim of extradition, delivery, or some other similar legal act.

⁷⁸ The INTERPOL's definition for "Notice": implies any request for international cooperation or any international alarm published by INTERPOL upon the request of any Central National Bureau, of of any International entity, or

processing of the requests of Kosovo Police for these categories, to INTERPOL's Office of UNMIK, and to the lack of access of the Border Police to the databases of INTERPOL.

An extreme case of delay in the processing of a request by Kosovo Police to the INTERPOL's Office of UNMIK, is the one of a person who was searched for a murder committed in Peja in 2008, in which it took more than two years to process a 'Red Notice' in the INTERPOL's system.⁸⁰ However, we should stress that there were improvements, and that now, the processing of the requests of Kosovo Police for Red Notices by INTERPOL's Office of UNMIK into the data-system in the headquarters of INTERPOL in Lyon is being done very fast.⁸¹ However, another particular difficulty in the cooperation of the Kosovo Police with INTERPOL is the one of the requests for 'Red Diffusions', which are not applicable for the Kosovo Police.⁸² This obstacle in the enforcement of the international law is being overcome through direct cooperation with the states that have recognized Kosovo,⁸³ and, on the other hand, regarding the regional and EU countries that have not recognized Kosovo, this type of international cooperation is being conducted through EULEX.⁸⁴

The impossibility of access to INTERPOL's system by Kosovo Police, and particularly, by the Border Police of Kosovo, is a major problem in the enforcement of the international law. In essence, this is a consequence of legal limitations that UNMIK has in relation to INTERPOL, given that UNMIK has the status of international entity, and not the one of a member of this organization, that is, the INTERPOL's Office in UNMIK does not have the status of a Central National Bureau. While the Central National Bureaus have, on the one hand, the right to use notices and diffusions of INTERPOL, for international entity this right is subject to authorization by INTERPOL,⁸⁵ and, on the other, while the Central National

upon the initiative of the Secretary General, which is send to all the members of INTERPOL; INTERPOL Rules on the Processing of Data [III/IRPD/GA/2011(2014)], Article 1: Definitions, pika 13.

⁷⁹ The definition of INTERPOL-it for "Diffusion": implies any request for international cooperation or any international alarm by an Central National Bureau or international entity, send directly to one or more National Bureaus, to one or more international entities, to be registered simultaneously into the police databases of INTERPOL. Ibid, point 14.

⁸⁰ An interview with Shqipe Mjekiqi, May 30, 2016, and with Major Veton Elshani, June 7, 2016.

⁸¹ An interview with a high official of UNMIK, May 12, 2016.

⁸² An interview with Major Veton Elshani, June 7, 2016.

⁸³ An interview with Shqipe Mjekiqi, May 30, 2016.

⁸⁴ An interview with Major Veton Elshani, June 7, 2016.

⁸⁵ Article 8: The Use of Notices and Diffusions of INTERPOL, point 2. INTERPOL Rules on the Processing of Data [III/IRPD/GA/2011(2014)].

Bureau's have the right to authorize the institutions of their own countries to have access into the databases of INTERPOL (for instance, their Border Police's), this right is not recognized at all to international entities.⁸⁶ As a consequence, there were cases in which, the persons that were searched by INTERPOL did pass the Kosovo's side of the border between Kosovo and Serbia without any problem, just in order to be arrested immediately when they were entering into the Serbia's side of this border.⁸⁷

On the other hand, the very processing of the requests of the Kosovo's ILECU for Red Notices, in the INTERPOL's Office in UNMIK, is very complicated as far as the administration and decision-making is concerned, and this is seen from the scheme in the figure below. For a better explanation of this scheme, we should take into the consideration, first that the requests for the publication of notices that are sent to INTERPOL by the Central National Bureau's or by international entities, should obtain previously the quality and the legality of data supporting those requests, and these data should also fulfill the condition that they should be in the interest of the objective of police cooperation.⁸⁸ These requests are, afterwards, examined by the General Secretariat of INTERPOL,⁸⁹ and if they fulfill the criteria, they are published.⁹⁰ The minimal criteria that should be fulfilled in the case of a request for the publication of a Red Notice, are the following ones: the act must present a serious crime; the sentence threshold for a person searched is at least two years; if the person searched is requested for finishing the sentence, this person must have been punished with at least six months of imprisonment, or should have at least six months of imprisonment unfinished; the request should be in the interest of the objective for international police cooperation; the identity and legal data should be attached (the summary of the facts on the case, the charge, the laws that cover the crime, the highest sentence possible, the sentence delivered, and the part of the sentence remaining to be finished), as well as the reference and the valid executive order for arrest, or any legal decision that has the same effect.⁹¹

⁸⁶ Article 21: The Provision of the Authorization for Direct Access in the Informative System of INTERPOL at the National Level.


⁸⁷ An interview with Mss. Shqipe Mjekiqi, May 30, 2016.

⁸⁸ Article 76: The Request for the Publication of the Notices, INTERPOL Rules on the Processing of Data [III/IRPD/GA/2011(2014)].

⁸⁹ Article 77: The Examination of the Requests by the General Secretariat, INTERPOL Rules on the Processing of Data [III/IRPD/GA/2011(2014)].

⁹⁰ Ibid. Article 79: The Publication of Notices.

⁹¹ Ibid. Article 83: Specific Conditions for the Publication of the Red Notices.



If we analyze the steps presented in the above scheme, in the light of the criteria of INTERPOL for the requests for the publication of 'Red Notices', we come to the conclusion that the proceeding process for the requests made by the ILECU of the Kosovo Police is much more complicated than the one in the cases of the requests made by Central National Bureaus. In the cases of the requests made by Central National Bureaus, the Ministry of Justice is not involved in the process, like in the Kosovar case,⁹² and, indeed, in these cases the international institutions are not involved as well. In contrast to this, in the Kosovo case the international institutions involved are the EUSR, the Legal Office of UNMIK, the SRSG/UNMIK, as well as the INTERPOL's Office in UNMIK itself. However, what is surprising in this entire cycle, is the presence of the processing step of the Ministry of Justice, which would have been fully understandable in the cases of the requests for extradition made to Kosovo by other states, but not at all in the processing of the requests for publication of 'Red Notices' that Kosovo makes to INTERPOL, simply because of the fact that processing of these requests goes completely between the police and judiciary. Furthermore, another additional element that increases further the delays in the processing of

⁹² An interview with Major Veton Elshani, June 7, 2016.

the requests for Red Notices of Kosovo's ILECU, is the lack of sufficient staff for working in the INTERPOL's Office of UNMIK (there are 4 international employees, and one local, for archive), as well as the fact that their working time-table is the same with that of the other UNMIK staff (08:00 to 16:00, with break during the weekends)⁹³, which doesn't fit with the timetable of the General Secretariat of INTERPOL (24/7), as well as with the one of Kosovo's ILECU (24/7).

THE PROSPECTS FOR KOSOVO'S MEMBERSHIP IN INTERPOL

The procedure for a country to become a member of INTERPOL depends upon two key bodies of this institution, namely, on General Assembly, and on Executive Committee. According to the Constitution of INTERPOL, the request for membership should be delivered by the respective governmental authority to the General Secretariat of INTERPOL, and the membership should be subject to the approval by the two-third majority of the members of the General Assembly.⁹⁴ The General Assembly has 190 member countries, and, therefore, the membership requires at least 127 votes in support of the membership proposal. By taking into the consideration the fact that Kosovo is until now recognized by 111 states, for obtaining the membership in INTERPOL, it needs the votes of at least 16 countries that didn't recognize her yet. In recent circumstances, the placing of the application for the membership of Kosovo into agenda of the General Assembly of INTERPOL might quite easily suffer the same fate as the application of Kosovo for membership in UNESCO, that is, the failure that Kosovo suffered in November of the last year when it applied for the membership in this organization.

Furthermore, even the request for membership cannot enter directly on the agenda of the meetings of the General Assembly, given that this agenda is previously prepared by the Executive Committee of INTERPOL.⁹⁵ The decisions of the Executive Committee are taken with the majority of votes of the members present (except in specific cases – for instance, for the election of the Secretary General, two-thirds of the votes are needed),⁹⁶ and for the quorum the presence of at least 2/3 of the members is

⁹³ An interview with a high official of UNMIK, May 12, 2016.

⁹⁴ Article 4. Constitution of the ICPO-INTERPOL, INTERPOL Office on Legal Affairs, [I/CONS/GA/1956(2008)].

⁹⁵ Ibid. Article 22 (b).

⁹⁶ Article. 7. (2). Rules of Procedure of the Executive Committee, INTERPOL Office on Legal Affairs, [II.B/RPEC/GA/1994].

required.⁹⁷ In this body of INTERPOL the situation is also not favorable, given that 7 out of the 13 members of the Executive Committee are representatives of the states that have not recognized Kosovo.

Having in mind this procedure for obtaining the membership, as well as the fact that Kosovo is not fully recognized yet by the international community, we should not be surprised by the fact that the requests of Kosovo for membership in INTERPOL, which were made earlier, initially in 2008, by the then Interior Minister, Bajram Rexhepi, and, recently, by the Minister Skender Hyseni, in 2015,⁹⁸ did not succeed to pass even the procedural threshold of the Executive Committee.

Nevertheless, the placing of the issue of Kosovo's membership through a decision by Executive Committee, in the agenda of the General Assembly of INTERPOL, is not the only possibility to proceed with Kosovo's membership application. The members of INTERPOL do also have the possibility to propose items of the agenda, once after they have received the preliminary draft of the provisional agenda, and they can do this up to 30 days before the beginning of the General Assembly, which is done in accordance with the right for modification of agenda by putting a new item in agenda.⁹⁹ Afterwards, the Executive Committee, based on the provisional agenda, forms the final agenda, with the requested additional items.¹⁰⁰ Thus, the item for the membership of Kosovo can be proposed by any member of the organization, and this will, afterwards, become an item of the final agenda of the General Assembly. Furthermore, the General Assembly can decide to place in its agenda every item that is considered important and urgent,¹⁰¹ and the decisions of this type are made with simple majority of votes.¹⁰² These legal possibilities for membership through sponsors from the member countries of INTERPOL, were not used yet by the Kosovo Government.

⁹⁷ Ibid. Article. 7 (7).

⁹⁸ An interview with Mss. Shqipe Mjekiqi, May 30, 2016.

⁹⁹ Article 11, General Regulations of the International Criminal Police Organization- INTERPOL [I/GREG/GA/1956(2014)].

¹⁰⁰ Article. 13. Rules of Procedure of the ICPO-INTERPOL General Assembly, INTERPOL Office on Legal Affairs, [I/CONS/GA/1956(2008)].

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Article 19 and Article 11, General Regulations of the International Criminal Police Organization – INTERPOL [I/GREG/GA/1956(2014)].

On the other hand, the fact should be stressed here that Kosovo Police has finished its “homework” regarding the interoperability and the demands on the standards for data protection and legal guarantees that INTERPOL puts before its members. In March of the previous year EULEX has made an assesment on the fulfillment of these criteria, and it came to the conclusion that Kosovo is ready to join INTERPOL.¹⁰³ Therefore, it is completely clear that the existing capacities of the Kosovo Police are not an obstacle for its membership in the INTERPOL, and that the real obstacles are of political nature.

Furthermore, the Legal Office of UNMIK considers that the issue of the membership of Kosovo in INTERPOL is an issue of INTERPOL, and not of UNMIK.¹⁰⁴ But, on the other side, the policy of the MIA and of the Kosovo Police is to don’t participate in the meetings and activities in which their participation goes through UNMIK,¹⁰⁵ including here the meetings of the General Assembly of INTERPOL, and its regional meetings. However, UNMIK does not consider that this attitude is a useful one, given that this limits the possibility of direct contacts with members of INTERPOL, in the meetings and activites of this organization, including here the contacts with the countries that have not recognized Kosovo.¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, there is an impression in UNMIK that the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Kosovo thinks that it is exactly UNMIK that is blocking the membership of Kosovo in INTERPOL. UNMIK considers such an attitude as wrong, given that it considers itself to be, neither opposing, nor promoting, the membership of Kosovo in this organization.¹⁰⁷

On the other hand, Kosovo insists that INTERPOL should make direct invitations to Kosovo for its meetings and activites, rather than to go through UNMIK. Legaly, this possibility exists, given that INTERPOL can also invite for participation in the meetings of the General Assembly the police organizations that are not its members, in the capacity of the observers. However, even in such a case, the list of observers is prepared by the Executive Committee, and it is then send for approval to the country where the meeting of the General Assembly is going to take place,¹⁰⁸ and this will complicate further the possibility for participation, having in mind the recent composition of the Executive

¹⁰³ EULEX Project to support Kosovo in their efforts to become an INTERPOL member, March 18, 2015.

¹⁰⁴ An interview with Mss. Shqipe Mjekiqi, May 30 2016.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ An interview with a high official of UNMIK, May 12, 2016.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Article. 6. Rules of Procedure of the ICPO-INTERPOL, General Assembly, INTERPOL Office on Legal Affairs, [I/CONS/GA/1956(2008)].

Committee, as well as the additional possibility that the meeting might take place in some from the countries which have not recognized Kosovo, and which can be hostile towards its independence. In such an occasion, we can conclude that the likelihood for Kosovo to participate in the meetings of the General Assembly of INTERPOL is almost equal, if not even smaller, then the likelihood that the Executive Committee will place into agenda the item of its membership. Also, we should take into the consideration the fact that the General Assembly of INTERPOL holds its regular meetings once a year,¹⁰⁹ which, in terms of time, limits further the possibility for Kosovo to participate in its meeting.

CONLUSSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Kosovo has fulfilled all the criteria for becoming part of INTERPOL, but its membership in this organization is blocked as a consequence of the fact that it is not recognized fully by the international community. Given that 7 out of the 13 members of the Executive Committee of INTERPOL have not recognized the independence of Kosovo, the issue of its membership was not proceeded in the General Assembly of this organization, despite the fact that Kosovo has made its applications ever since 2008. However, it is worrisome that Kosovo is recognized by only 111 out from 190 countries that are members of INTERPOL, at the time when it needs the votes of 127 members of the General Assembly of this organization, a fact that, for the moment, makes its membership uncertain.

The cooperation of Kosovo with INTERPOL through UNMIK continues to be approximately the same as it was before the independence of Kosovo was declared. The Kosovo Police practically remains a sub-agency, subordinated to INTERPOL's Office of UNMIK, in the aspect of the operationality, as well as in the communication with the General Secretariat of INTERPOL in Lyon. The Kosovo Police, including here the Border Police, does not have an access to databases and to analytical reports of the crimes of INTERPOL, and this remains a huge handicap in the fighting of crime and in the preventing of terrorism within the country and in the region.

The proceeding of the requests of Kosovo Police, for publication by INTERPOL of the Red Notices, is more complicated and longer, than in the cases of Central National Bureaus. In the cases of Central

¹⁰⁹ Ibid. Article 2.

National Bureaus, this process does not include the Ministry of Justice,¹¹⁰ and, indeed, it also does not include the international institutions, as in the case of Kosovo, where the EUSR, Legal Office of UNMIK, SRSG/UNMIK, as well as the INTERPOL's Office of UNMIK, are included. Also, an important operational problem remains the clumsiness of the proceeding of the requests for publication of the notices of Kosovo Police by the INTERPOL's Office in UNMIK, and the element that has the highest influence in the lack of trust of Kosovo Police on this Office, is its management by the police officers from the countries that have not recognized Kosovo.

By having in mind the above mentioned facts and conclusions, KIPRED makes the following recommendations:

1. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should build a joint operational strategy to enable the placement of the item of Kosovo's membership in the agenda of the session of the General Assembly of INTERPOL, after obtaining previously the support of 2/3 of its members. On this occasion, the MFA and the MIA can draw lessons from the failure of the application for membership of Kosovo in the UNESCO, in the November of the previous year.
2. The step of the Justice Ministry should be taken out from the process of the proceeding of the requests for publication of the Red Notices, given that this Ministry is unnecessary, because the data to be published by INTERPOL are only of police and judiciary nature.
3. Until Kosovo does not become a member of INTERPOL, the INTERPOL's Office in UNMIK, together with the General Secretariat of INTERPOL, should consider finding of an solution which will enable a direct access of Kosovo Police into the databases of INTERPOL.
4. UNMIK should take into the consideration the political sensibility regarding the issue of the governance of the INTERPOL's Office by the police officers that come from the countries that have not recognized Kosovo.
5. The INTERPOL's Office of UNMIK should work with the same timetable (24/7) as the General Secretariat of INTERPOL, and as Kosovo's ILECU, and should have sufficient personnel for effective processing of the requests of the Kosovo Police for publication of its notices by INTERPOL.

¹¹⁰ An interview with Major Veton Elshani, June 7, 2016.

A BRIEF ANALYTICAL OVERVIEW OF THE PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY

As the previous issues of Observer, this one also includes the public opinion survey regarding the trust that citizens of Kosovo have on the major institutions of the Republic of Kosovo dealing with security. This time the number of the citizens surveyed was 1,065, and the tables at the end of the issue have the results acquired, as well as the comparison of the results provided in the four issues of the Observer published so far. Again, the question posed to the respondents was “Would you, please, tell us how much do you trust the following institutions regarding the security issues?”, and, again, the institutions mentioned were: 1) the President; 2) Prime Minister; 3) the Minister of Internal Affairs; 4) the Kosovo Police; 5) the Parliamentary Commission for Security, Internal Affairs and the Kosovo Security Force; 6) the Minister of the Kosovo Security Force; 7) the Kosovo Security Force; 8) the Intelligence Agency of Kosovo; 9) the Director of the Intelligence Agency of Kosovo, and: 10) the Parliamentary Commission for Intelligence. The citizens expressed their trust in values from the lowest score 1, up to the highest 5. The survey was conducted by the firm UBO Consulting, and the margin of error was $\pm 3\%$.

Compared with the April 2016 issue, the largest part of the institutions have recorded the increase in the trust; the only exceptions are the Kosovo Police (KP) and the Kosovo Security Force (KSF), which have had slight decreases in trust – KP from 3.64 into 3.63, and the KSF from 3.69 into 3.60. Nevertheless, the values of trust expressed for the KP and the KSF are the highest among all the institutions for which the trust of Kosovo citizens was measured. The lowest levels of trust were expressed for the Prime Minister, 2.47, the Minister of Internal Affairs, 2.55, and the Director of the Intelligence Agency of Kosovo, 2.55.

Given that in the period between the previous and the recent issue of Observer, the former President of Kosovo, Mss. Atifete Jahjaga, was replaced with the new President, Mr. Hashim Thaçi, it is interesting to look at the trust for the President – this trust has the value 2.77. The values of trust expressed on the former President Jahjaga, obtained for July 2015, November 2015, and February 2016, were 2.95, 2.69, and 2.68, which means that with the new President we have a small increase of the trust when compared with the last measurement for former President Jahjaga. Also, we should stress that in the three last surveys we can notice an increasing trend of trust for almost all the institutions, by emphasizing that the highest trust recorded was the one expressed in the first survey, of July 2015 (and that after this first survey we have had two surveys with considerably lower values of trust).

The other important and interesting data from the survey of May 2016 (and from its comparison with that of February 2016), are given in the continuation:

- Among the Albanians that live in the North of Kosovo, the highest trust was expressed for the Kosovo Police and for the Kosovo Security Force – both these institutions have the same value of trust, 3.83. The lowest scores were for the Minister of Interior Affairs and for the Intelligence Agency of Kosovo – again, we have the same value for both institutions, 2.17. Otherwise, the institutions that had decrease in trust compared to the previous issue of Observer were KSF (from 4.00 to 3.83), meanwhile, an increase was recorded for the Kosovo Police (from 3.09 to 3.83), the President, who was replaced, as mentioned (from 1.36 to 2.50), and the Prime Minister (from 1.45 to 2.50).
- The highest assessment among the Serbs in the North was given to the Kosovo Police (1.82), the Prime Minister (1.52) and the Minister of Internal Affairs (1.05). All the other institutions did have the lowest trust among this category of respondents, 1.00. Meanwhile, among the Serbs in the South, a little bit higher assessment was recorded for the Kosovo Police (1.46), Prime Minister (1.29), President (1.13) and Minister for Internal Affairs (1.11) – all the other institutions were assessed with scores below 1.1. Here we can notice the decrease of trust towards Kosovo Police when compared with four months earlier, which among the Serbs in North and those in South, in February 2016 was expressed with grades 2.04 and 2.45.
- As far as trust expressed based on gender is concerned, we can see that the increase of general trust was caused by the increase of trust among male respondents – only KSF did have decrease of trust among male respondents, and all the nine other institutions have recorded an increase. Meanwhile, the trust of female respondents in the survey of May shows very similar results as those in the survey of February – although, even among female respondents we can notice a slight increase of trust. Regarding the variable of age, we see that the general increase of trust does not have any particular regularity, and that, in general, it is distributed evenly in all the analyzed ranges of age. As far as the variable of education is concerned, in the comparison of values acquired in May and February of 2016, we notice an increase of the trust on President and Prime Minister among the respondents with the lowest levels of education – that is, among the respondents who have finished only elementary school, several years of secondary school, and only secondary school. Meanwhile, there are no other trends, and the general increase of

trust on other institutions is distributed approximately equally at all the levels of education of the respondents.

- Regarding the ethnicity of the respondents, we can notice a slight increase of the trust on the President, and a slight decrease of the trust on the Prime Minister among the Albanians (+0.11 for the President, and -0.16 for the Prime Minister), and a pronounced decrease of the trust on both of them among the Serbs (-1.03 for the President, and -0.27 for the Prime Minister), and a considerable increase of trust among the other ethnicities (+0.59 for the President, and +0.38 for the Prime Minister). Also, we can see that all the mentioned institutions, except for the Kosovo Police, enjoy higher trust in the category of other ethnicities, than in the category of Albanians. Among the Serbs, the trust on the given institutions is lower, and, unfortunately, the trend of the increase of trust among the Serbs that was recorded in February 2016 did not continue. In other words, the trend of the increase of trust among the Serbs recorded in February 2016 was not typical in the long term, so, it is interesting to investigate what has caused that trend during that period.
- In the variable of the profession of respondents, we can see a considerable increase of the trust on all the given institutions in the category of retirees, except for the Kosovo Police, which has recorded a slight decrease of trust among the respondents in this category (from 3.91 to 3.79). Otherwise, the category which has expressed the highest trust on these institutions in the three previous surveys was that of house-wives; in the last survey, the fourth one, retirees take the first place in trust, and the house-wives descend to the second. Also, we can notice a considerable increase, although not a huge one, of the trust of the respondents employed in the private sector. Otherwise, the lowest trust on the institutions given in the survey was expressed by the category of respondents employed in the public sector, and, a little bit above them, the category of those who are not employed at all.
- As far as the trust through the Kosovo regions is concerned, the President enjoys the highest trust in Peja and in Ferizaj (3.30), and the lowest one in Gjakova (1.89); the Prime Minister enjoys the highest trust in Peja and Prizren (2.96 and 2.72), and the lowest one in Gjakova (1.82); the Kosovo Police and the Kosovo Security Force have the highest trust in Ferizaj (4.24 and 4.66), and the lowest one in Gjakova (3.18 and 3.19). Also, the Minister of Internal Affairs has, together with the KP and KSF, the most uniform distribution of trust (the lowest trust is 2.20 in Gjilan, and the highest one is 2.78, in Prizren and Peja). Otherwise, the other evaluated institutions have higher deviations, although, not huge ones.

- As mentioned above, the trend of the increase of trust of Serbs in the institutions evaluated, which was recorded in the previous survey of February 2016, did not continue, and was, thus, limited only to that period. We can notice a small decrease of the general trust of Serbs in the Kosovo Police, by adding that, generally, the Serbs in several regions have quite high trust on KP: for instance, the trust of the Serbs of Ferizaj on Kosovo Police that was recorded in February was 3.00, and this trust, in the recent survey, of May, is 2.85. On the other hand, the trust of the Serbs of all the regions in the KSF is 1.00, with the only exception of the Serbs of Prishtina who have evaluated their trust on KSF with 1.05. The lowest trend of trust on the institutions given is the one recorded in Gjakova, and this low trust was expressed by both, Albanians, and the others.

Could you, please, tell us, how much do you trust the below-mentioned security institutions?					
	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
The President	1065	1	5	2.771	1.379
The Prime Minister	1065	1	5	2.470	1.255
The Minister of Interior Affairs	1065	1	5	2.545	1.162
The Kosovo Police	1065	1	5	3.634	1.190
The Parliamentary Commission for Internal Affairs, Security and the Kosovo Security Force Oversight	1065	1	5	2.915	1.161
The Minister of Security Force	1065	1	5	3.067	1.245
The Kosovo Security Force	1065	1	5	3.595	1.265
The Kosovo Intelligence Agency	1065	1	5	2.728	1.191
The Director of the Kosovo Intelligence Agency	1065	1	5	2.554	1.161
The Parliamentary Commission on Intelligence	1065	1	5	2.614	1.162

Table 1. The General Trust on the Institutions

Could you, please, tell us, how much do you trust the below-mentioned security institutions?					
Alternatives	Jul-15	Nov-15	Feb-16	May-16	Difference (May 2016 - July 2015)
	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	
The President	2.95	2.69	2.68	2.771	-0.180
The Prime Minister	2.67	2.50	2.31	2.470	-0.202
The Minister of Internal Affairs	2.75	2.49	2.35	2.545	-0.204
The Kosovo Police	3.79	3.58	3.64	3.634	-0.156
The Parliamentary Commission for Internal Affairs, Security and the Kosovo Security Force Oversight	3.17	2.71	2.71	2.915	-0.257
The Minister of Security Force	3.33	2.86	3.00	3.067	-0.259
The Kosovo Security Force	4.00	3.58	3.69	3.595	-0.402
Kosovo Intelligence Agency	3.02	2.57	2.57	2.728	-0.295
The Director of the Kosovo Intelligence Agency	2.88	2.40	2.40	2.554	-0.324
The Parliamentary Commission for Intelligence	3.01	2.52	2.38	2.614	-0.399

Table 2. The comparison of trust expressed in all the surveys

Could you, please, tell us, how much do you trust the below-mentioned security institutions?

Ethnicity		The President	The Prime Minister	The Minister of Interior Affairs	The Kosovo Police	The Parliamentary Commission for Internal Affairs, Security and the Kosovo Security Force Oversight	The Minister of Kosovo Security Force	The Kosovo Security Force	The Kosovo Intelligence Agency	The Director of the Kosovo Intelligence Agency	The Parliamentary Commission for Intelligence
		Albanian	Mean	2.50	2.50	2.17	3.83	2.50	2.58	3.83	2.17
	N	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12
	Std. Deviation	1.087	1.168	1.030	.718	.674	.669	.389	.835	.793	.754

Table 3. The Albanians resident in the North

Could you, please, tell us, how much do you trust the below-mentioned security institutions?

		The President	The Prime Minister	The Minister of Internal Affairs	The Kosovo Police	The Parliamentary Commission for Internal Affairs, Security and the Kosovo Security Force Oversight	The Minister of the Kosovo Security Force	The Kosovo Security Force	The Kosovo Intelligence Agency	The Director of the Kosovo Intelligence Agency	The Parliamentary Commission for Intelligence
		Serbs North	Mean	1.00	1.52	1.05	1.82	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
	N	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60
	Std. Deviation	0.000	.701	.220	.624	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	.334
Serbs South	Mean	1.13	1.29	1.11	1.46	1.08	1.08	1.06	1.08	1.08	1.09
	N	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90
	Std. Deviation	.455	.585	.381	.823	.308	.308	.230	.269	.269	.323

Table 4. The Serbs, North, South

Could you, please, tell us, how much do you trust the below-mentioned security institutions?

D10. Residence		The President	The Prime Minister	The Minister of Internal Affairs	The Kosovo Police	The Parliamentary Commission for Internal Affairs, Security and the Kosovo Security Force Oversight	The Minister of the Kosovo Security Force	The Kosovo Security Force	The Kosovo Intelligence Agency	The Director of the Kosovo Intelligence Agency	The Parliamentary Commission for Intelligence
		Urban	Mean	2.54	2.30	2.34	3.42	2.76	2.89	3.35	2.53
	N	474	474	474	474	474	474	474	474	474	474
Rural	Mean	2.96	2.61	2.71	3.81	3.04	3.21	3.79	2.88	2.70	2.78
	N	591	591	591	591	591	591	591	591	591	591
Total	Mean	2.77	2.47	2.55	3.63	2.91	3.07	3.59	2.73	2.55	2.61
	N	1065	1065	1065	1065	1065	1065	1065	1065	1065	1065

Table 5. Residence

Could you, please, tell us, how much do you trust the below-mentioned security institutions?

D1. GENDER		The President	The Prime Minister	The Minister of Internal Affairs	The Kosovo Police	The Parliamentary Commission for Internal Affairs, Security and the Kosovo Security Force Oversight	The Minister of the Kosovo Security Force	The Kosovo Security Force	The Kosovo Intelligence Agency	The Director of the Kosovo Intelligence Agency	The Parliamentary Commission for Intelligence
Male	Mean	2.77	2.44	2.54	3.63	2.85	3.08	3.63	2.66	2.53	2.57
	N	551	551	551	551	551	551	551	551	551	551
Female	Mean	2.78	2.51	2.56	3.63	2.99	3.06	3.55	2.80	2.58	2.66
	N	514	514	514	514	514	514	514	514	514	514
Total	Mean	2.77	2.47	2.55	3.63	2.91	3.07	3.59	2.73	2.55	2.61
	N	1065	1065	1065	1065	1065	1065	1065	1065	1065	1065

Table 6. Gender

Could you, please, tell us, how much do you trust the below-mentioned security institutions?

D2. AGE		The President	The Prime Minister	The Minister of Internal Affairs	The Kosovo Police	The Parliamentary Commission for Internal Affairs, Security and the Kosovo Security Force Oversight	The Minister of the Kosovo Security Force	The Kosovo Security Force	The Kosovo Intelligence Agency	The Director of the Kosovo Intelligence Agency	The Parliamentary Commission for Intelligence
18-24	Mean	2.87	2.44	2.61	3.59	2.98	3.09	3.59	2.83	2.67	2.76
	N	304	304	304	304	304	304	304	304	304	304
25-34	Mean	2.76	2.46	2.52	3.69	2.90	2.87	3.57	2.73	2.51	2.60
	N	318	318	318	318	318	318	318	318	318	318
35-44	Mean	2.89	2.65	2.63	3.73	3.00	3.18	3.57	2.73	2.51	2.57
	N	191	191	191	191	191	191	191	191	191	191
45-54	Mean	2.61	2.25	2.37	3.62	2.76	3.25	3.74	2.59	2.47	2.47
	N	135	135	135	135	135	135	135	135	135	135
55-64	Mean	2.40	2.30	2.31	3.25	2.61	2.84	3.15	2.39	2.31	2.29
	N	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85
65 +	Mean	3.02	3.17	3.06	3.97	3.41	3.91	4.53	3.23	3.12	3.07
	N	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32
Total	Mean	2.77	2.47	2.55	3.63	2.91	3.07	3.59	2.73	2.55	2.61
	N	1065	1065	1065	1065	1065	1065	1065	1065	1065	1065

Table 7. Age

Could you, please, tell us, how much do you trust the below-mentioned security institutions?

D3. EDUCATION		The President	The Prime Minister	The Minister of Internal Affairs	The Kosovo Police	The Parliamentary Commission for Internal Affairs, Security and the Kosovo Security Force Oversight	The Minister of the Kosovo Security Force	The Kosovo Security Force	The Kosovo Intelligence Agency	The Director of the Kosovo Intelligence Agency	The Parliamentary Commission for Intelligence
Elementary school unfinished	Mean	3.34	3.25	2.95	3.89	3.63	3.28	3.81	3.12	3.05	2.97
	N	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16
Elementary School	Mean	3.14	2.72	2.73	3.80	3.12	3.53	3.88	2.92	2.78	2.85
	N	103	103	103	103	103	103	103	103	103	103
Secondary school unfinished	Mean	2.73	2.45	2.52	3.70	2.90	3.13	3.68	2.73	2.54	2.53
	N	494	494	494	494	494	494	494	494	494	494
Secondary school	Mean	2.71	2.39	2.51	3.50	2.82	2.83	3.38	2.61	2.45	2.59
	N	242	242	242	242	242	242	242	242	242	242
Faculty	Mean	2.70	2.47	2.53	3.44	2.91	3.00	3.49	2.73	2.59	2.69
	N	166	166	166	166	166	166	166	166	166	166
Master	Mean	2.80	2.27	2.49	3.91	2.91	2.80	3.52	2.77	2.47	2.69
	N	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44
Total	Mean	2.77	2.47	2.55	3.63	2.91	3.07	3.59	2.73	2.55	2.61
	N	1065	1065	1065	1065	1065	1065	1065	1065	1065	1065

Tabela 8. Education

Could you, please, tell us, how much do you trust the below-mentioned security institutions?

D6. EMPLOYMENT		The President	The Prime Minister	The Minister of Internal Affairs	The Kosovo Police	The Parliamentary Commission for Internal Affairs, Security and the Kosovo Security Force Oversight	The Minister of the Kosovo Security Force	The Kosovo Security Force	The Kosovo Intelligence Agency	The Director of the Kosovo Intelligence Agency	The Parliamentary Commission for Intelligence
Unemployed - searching for job	Mean	2.65	2.50	2.49	3.63	2.90	3.22	3.77	2.61	2.47	2.52
	N	223	223	223	223	223	223	223	223	223	223
Unemployed - not searching for job	Mean	2.69	2.26	2.56	3.47	2.85	2.98	3.43	2.49	2.17	2.38
	N	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	49
Employed in the public sector	Mean	2.66	2.63	2.70	3.58	2.76	2.80	3.30	2.65	2.44	2.64
	N	111	111	111	111	111	111	111	111	111	111
Employed in the private sector	Mean	2.75	2.34	2.45	3.54	2.91	3.09	3.53	2.72	2.54	2.52
	N	305	305	305	305	305	305	305	305	305	305
Employed, time after time	Mean	2.80	2.44	2.54	3.70	2.66	2.72	3.40	2.64	2.56	2.58
	N	59	59	59	59	59	59	59	59	59	59
Retiree	Mean	3.06	3.05	2.98	3.79	3.32	3.53	4.07	3.17	3.07	3.13
	N	36	36	36	36	36	36	36	36	36	36
House-wife	Mean	3.14	2.74	2.64	3.91	3.12	3.31	3.87	2.87	2.67	2.75
	N	89	89	89	89	89	89	89	89	89	89
Student/ pupil	Mean	2.80	2.37	2.55	3.68	2.95	2.94	3.55	2.86	2.68	2.77
	N	193	193	193	193	193	193	193	193	193	193
Total	Mean	2.77	2.47	2.55	3.63	2.91	3.07	3.59	2.73	2.55	2.61
	N	1065	1065	1065	1065	1065	1065	1065	1065	1065	1065

Table 9. Employment

Could you, please, tell us, how much do you trust the below-mentioned security institutions?

D4. (ETHNICITY) Which is your nationality/To which group you belong?		The President	The Prime Minister	The Minister of Internal Affairs	The Kosovo Police	The Parliamentary Commission for Internal Affairs, Security and the Kosovo Security Force Oversight	The Minister of the Kosovo Security Force	The Kosovo Security Force	The Kosovo Intelligence Agency	The Director of the Kosovo Intelligence Agency	The Parliamentary Commission for Intelligence
Albanian	Mean	2.81	2.49	2.58	3.70	2.97	3.12	3.67	2.77	2.59	2.65
	N	815	815	815	815	815	815	815	815	815	815
Serb	Mean	1.08	1.38	1.09	1.60	1.05	1.05	1.03	1.05	1.05	1.09
	N	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150
Other	Mean	3.30	3.04	3.02	3.61	3.19	3.29	3.69	3.06	3.04	3.03
	N	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total	Mean	2.61	2.38	2.41	3.40	2.72	2.85	3.30	2.55	2.41	2.46
	N	1065	1065	1065	1065	1065	1065	1065	1065	1065	1065

Table 10. Ethnicity

Could you, please, tell us, how much do you trust the below-mentioned security institutions?

D11. REGION		The President	The Prime Minister	The Minister of Internal Affairs	The Kosovo Police	The Parliamentary Commission for Internal Affairs, Security and the Kosovo Security Force Oversight	The Minister of the Kosovo Security Force	The Kosovo Security Force	The Kosovo Intelligence Agency	The Director of the Kosovo Intelligence Agency	The Parliamentary Commission for Intelligence
Prishtina	Mean	2.68	2.38	2.59	3.73	3.06	3.06	3.63	2.70	2.53	2.52
	N	275	275	275	275	275	275	275	275	275	275
Mitrovica	Mean	2.71	2.51	2.43	3.60	2.73	2.62	3.49	2.31	2.07	2.42
	N	141	141	141	141	141	141	141	141	141	141
Prizren	Mean	3.30	2.72	2.78	3.57	3.07	3.30	3.75	3.05	3.02	3.05
	N	195	195	195	195	195	195	195	195	195	195
Peja	Mean	2.78	2.96	2.78	3.67	2.65	2.69	3.06	2.60	2.43	2.42
	N	103	103	103	103	103	103	103	103	103	103
Ferizaj	Mean	3.30	2.61	2.64	4.24	3.64	4.35	4.66	3.16	3.00	3.01
	N	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108
Gjakova	Mean	1.89	1.82	2.26	3.18	2.62	2.93	3.19	2.62	2.42	2.32
	N	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121
Gjilan	Mean	2.61	2.35	2.20	3.45	2.44	2.55	3.30	2.58	2.27	2.47
	N	122	122	122	122	122	122	122	122	122	122
Total	Mean	2.77	2.47	2.55	3.63	2.91	3.07	3.59	2.73	2.55	2.61
	N	1065	1065	1065	1065	1065	1065	1065	1065	1065	1065

Table 11. Region

Could you, please, tell us, how much do you trust the below-mentioned security institutions?

D4. (ETHNICITY) Which is your nationality/to which group you belongi?		The President	The Prime Minister	The Minister of Internal Affairs	The Kosovo Police	The Parliamentary Commission for Internal Affairs, Security and the Kosovo Security Force Oversight	The Minister of the Kosovo Security Force	The Kosovo Security Force	The Kosovo Intelligence Agency	The Director of the Kosovo Intelligence Agency	The Parliamentary Commission for Intelligence		
Albanian	Prishtina	Mean	2.68	2.38	2.60	3.76	3.08	3.08	3.66	2.71	2.54	2.53	
		N	213	213	213	213	213	213	213	213	213	213	
	Mitrovica	Mean	2.90	2.60	2.57	3.79	2.93	2.79	3.77	2.46	2.18	2.56	
		N	101	101	101	101	101	101	101	101	101	101	
	Prizren	Mean	3.28	2.69	2.77	3.58	3.07	3.31	3.75	3.06	3.03	3.05	
		N	151	151	151	151	151	151	151	151	151	151	
	Peja	Mean	2.78	2.99	2.81	3.73	2.66	2.71	3.09	2.61	2.44	2.43	
		N	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	
	Ferizaj	Mean	3.33	2.58	2.63	4.27	3.69	4.43	4.76	3.18	3.01	3.02	
		N	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	
	Gjakova	Mean	1.90	1.81	2.25	3.19	2.61	2.93	3.19	2.61	2.40	2.30	
		N	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	
	Gjilan	Mean	2.74	2.45	2.30	3.65	2.55	2.67	3.49	2.71	2.37	2.58	
		N	91	91	91	91	91	91	91	91	91	91	
Total	Mean	2.81	2.49	2.58	3.70	2.97	3.12	3.67	2.77	2.59	2.65		
	N	815	815	815	815	815	815	815	815	815	815		
Serb	Prishtina	Mean	1.15	1.10	1.05	1.20	1.05	1.05	1.05	1.10	1.10	1.10	
		N	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	
	Mitrovica	Mean	1.00	1.49	1.05	1.83	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.08	
		N	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	
	Peja	Mean	1.00	1.17	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	
		N	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	
	Ferizaj	Mean	1.00	2.08	1.15	2.85	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	
		N	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	
	Gjilani	Mean	1.20	1.17	1.15	1.17	1.13	1.13	1.09	1.11	1.11	1.13	
		N	46	46	46	46	46	46	46	46	46	46	
	Total	Mean	1.08	1.38	1.09	1.60	1.05	1.05	1.03	1.05	1.05	1.09	
		N	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	
	Other	Prishtina	Mean	3.20	2.87	2.93	3.90	3.37	3.50	3.97	3.13	3.00	3.00
			N	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30
Mitrovica		Mean	2.90	3.10	3.00	3.70	2.40	2.80	3.40	2.40	2.40	2.50	
		N	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	
Prizren		Mean	3.59	3.28	3.03	3.41	3.10	3.07	3.59	2.90	2.86	2.93	
		N	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	
Peja		Mean	3.60	2.80	2.50	2.90	2.80	2.80	3.10	3.00	2.90	2.80	
		N	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	
Ferizaj		Mean	4.60	4.20	4.20	4.50	4.50	4.50	4.60	4.40	4.40	4.40	
		N	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	
Gjakova		Mean	1.73	2.00	2.64	3.09	2.82	3.09	3.18	2.73	3.09	2.82	
		N	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	
Total		Mean	3.30	3.04	3.02	3.61	3.19	3.29	3.69	3.06	3.04	3.03	
		N	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	

Table 12. Region - Ethnicity



Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft
Confédération suisse
Confederazione Svizzera
Confederaziun svizra

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