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CONTENTS

Introduction.....	4
1. The Monitoring of the Internal Affairs Sector.....	6
2. The Monitoring of the Security Force Sector.....	15
3. The Monitoring of the Intelligence Sector	24
4. The (lack of) Public Transparency of the Kosovo Intelligence Agency.....	34
5. Brief Analytical Overview of the Public Opinion Research.....	52

INTRODUCTION

The third issue of the first volume of the Kosovo Security Sector Observer (KSSO) discusses analytically the key issues related to the sectors of internal affairs, intelligence, and the Security Force, which have dominated the public debate and the parliamentary oversight of these sectors during the period 15 November 2015 until 15 March 2016. In a separate public policy analysis, the KSSO discusses also the (lack of) transparency of the Kosovo Intelligence Agency, presenting also the outcome of the research regarding the public opinion trust related to the security matters of the respective governmental institutions and their leaders, as well as the respective parliamentary committees.

The section on Internal Affairs analyses briefly the developments related to the release of the tear gas in the Kosovo Assembly, the suspension of two police officers in Prizren due to the political intervention, the work of the Committee on Internal Affairs, Security and Supervision of the Kosovo Security Forces, also providing a presentation of the findings related to the public opinion research in regard to the citizens' trust for the security related matters regarding the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Kosovo Police, as well as the respective Parliamentary Committee.

The section on the Security Force analyses the procedural anomalies of the legislative nature and the creation of the politics of the Ministry of the KSF, the work of the Committee on Internal Affairs, Security and Supervision of the Kosovo Security Forces, also providing a presentation of the findings related to the public opinion research in regard to the citizens' trust for the security related matters regarding the Ministry of KSF, Kosovo Security Forces, as well as the respective parliamentary committees.

At the end of this volume of the KSSO it is provided a brief analysis of the key findings of the public opinion survey regarding the citizens' trust on the institutions from Kosovo Security Sector, conducted at the end of February 2016. In this part, in addition to the description of the

current situation of this trust, the trends related to its changes have been analysed in comparison with the equal measures as conducted previously, respectively during the month November and July 2015,

1. THE MONITORING OF THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS SECTOR

Introduction

During the period between November 2015 and March 2016, the Internal Affairs Sector is dominated by the usage of the tear gas in the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo by the opposite parties, namely by Vetvendosje (Self-Determination Party - LVV), Aleanca për Ardhmërinë e Kosovës (Alliance for the Future of Kosovo - AAK) and Nisma (Initiative). Although the problem of the tear gas was handled in the last Observer, it is considered as reasonable to handle it also here, since the security institutions of Kosovo have failed once again to prevent the entry of the tear gas in the premises of the Assembly of Kosovo.

Another important issue, which is related to the implementation of the law and the treatment of the personnel of the Kosovo Police, which shall be elaborated in the following analysis, is the case regarding the Regional Police of Prizren, respectively the suspension of two police officers, for issuing a ticket for the infraction of parking at the wrong place for Mr. Rasim Demiri, who is the Minister without Portfolio.

Also, under a special section of this analysis, we will handle the Supervision of the Internal Affairs Sector by the Parliamentary Committee on Internal Affairs, Security and Supervision of the Kosovo Security Forces, as well as the trust of citizens towards the institution of this sector.

The failure to prevent the entry of the tear gas in the Assembly of Kosovo

Despite the fact that the Chief of the Security of the Assembly of Kosovo, Captain Fatmir Shaqiri, was relocated to a different work position, and that in a very unclear manner, the entry of the tear gas still remains a typical “business as usual”.

It should not be forgotten here that the Captain Fatmir Shaqiri was initially accused for cooperation with the opposite parties for entering the tear gas in the Assembly of Kosovo, and that directly from the President of the Assembly, Kadri Veseli.¹ Afterwards, the Kosovo Police changes the duties and work position of the Captain Shaqiri, whereas the public opinion was informed that no measure of suspension has been undertaken against him,² despite the fact that the reason given in regard to the change of his work position was the failure to prevent the entry of the tear gas in the Assembly of Kosovo from some of its deputies (members of parliament).³

However, the subsequent developments proved that both these declarations regarding Captain Shaqiri, one given by the President of the Assembly, Kadri Veseli and the other one by the KP, were ungrounded, and moreover that that was not the plain problem, as the tear gas continued to be used in every plenary session of the Assembly of Kosovo.

In this case it became clear that the failure to prevent the entry of the tear gas was not depended on the performance of Captain Shaqiri, and this failure continues to question the protection of the security of the Kosovo Assembly. In regard to this matter, the responsibility for the failure to prevent the entry of the tear gas in the Assembly of Kosovo nevertheless cannot be sought beyond the chain of command of the Kosovo Police. Furthermore, although this problem has been continuing for half a year now, the Parliamentary Committee on Internal Affairs, Security and Supervision of the Kosovo Security Forces, has never considered it as reasonable to invite and listen the responsible structures of the Kosovo Police in regard to this matter. The lack of participation of the opposition in the Assembly of Kosovo cannot be reckoned as an alibi from the deputies of the position parties to not handle this very sensitive issue of the security of Kosovo.

¹ BotaSot: Veseli: The Chief of the security has cooperated with the opposition, 14 December 2015, <http://botasot.info/lajme/491017/veseli-shefi-i-sigurimit-te-kuvendit-ka-bashkepunuar-me-opoziten>

² Koha: Sheqiri not suspended, but transferred due to failure to secure the Assembly , 14 December 2015, <http://koha.net/?id=27&l=89036/>

³ Koha: Sheqiri not suspended, but transferred due to failure to secure the Assembly , 14 December 2015, <http://koha.net/?id=27&l=89036/>

Political interference in the application of the law

On 13 July 2015 two communication police officers from the Municipality of Prizren, Nazmi Jahiri and Enver Sejfullahu, who while conducting their duties of work⁴ they issued a ticket to to Mr. Rasim Demiri, the Minister without Portfolio, for the wrong parking of his vehicle.⁵ The Minister Demiri immediately filed an appeal against the two Police Officers allegedly for improper behaviour, by using also his public authority as a minister to request the suspending of these two police officers from their duty.⁶ Only a few hours after the incident, the Commander of the Police Station in Prizren, Mr. Nexhmi Krasniqi, submitted the decision on suspension for 48 hours to the police officers Jahiri and Sejfullahu. The suspension was made based on the reason that the police officers were engaged in incidents that represent severe disciplinary violations, on the basis of Administrative Instruction 06/2012 for Violations, Disciplinary Measures and Procedures in the Kosovo Police, Article 47, paragraph 3 and 4.⁷ However, this story did not end up here, because their suspension was extended for three other months, and investigations were already initiated against them.⁸

It should be mentioned here that KIPRED has requested to make an interview with the officials of the Police Station of Prizren and the Command of the Kosovo Police in Prishtina; however none of them has shown a willingness to make a statement in regard to this matter. The only ones who responded positively in regard to this matter were the officials of the Inspectorate of the Kosovo Police (IKP). IKP informed KIPRED that after concluding the investigation in regard to

⁴Zëri: Minister charged, police officers suspended (VIDEO), 12 February 2016, <http://zeri.info/kronika/75939/denuan-ministrin-u-suspenduan-policet-video>

⁵ Article 99, Law No. 02/L-70: Law on Road Traffic Safety, <https://gzk.rks-gov.net/ActDocumentDetail.aspx?ActID=2574>

⁶ Ibid

⁷ Zëri: Minister charged, police officers suspended (VIDEO), 12 February 2016, <http://zeri.info/kronika/75939/denuan-ministrin-u-suspenduan-policet-video>

⁸ Ibid.

this case, it had reached the conclusion that there were no legal violations or criminal offence made by the two police officers Nazmi Jahiri and Enver Sejfullahu.⁹

After the conclusion reached by IKP that there were no violations, the matter reached the Directory for Professional Standards, which issued a report through which the two police officers Nazmi Jahiri and Enver Sejfullahu were declared innocent for the above stated case, and on the basis of it, they were returned to their work place.¹⁰

The outcome of the application of the law resulted was the return of the police officers Nazmi Jahiri and Enver Sejfullahu at their work place, and it functioned in its entirety, however the use of the political authority to affect the conduct of work duties for the police officers of the Kosovo Police – as even this very simple case shows – remains a very concerning matter when dealing with the application of the law against the political officers, something that keeps the door open to their immunity.

Similar cases such as the one of the police officers Jahiri and Sejfullahu, who despite being temporarily defeated, because they chose to apply the law, they may intimidate other police officers from conducting their work duties whenever they have to encounter government officials or persons with political influence who are breaching the law.

Furthermore, it is ironic the fact that up to now there was no information whether the minister Demiri has paid the ticket issued to him by the police officers Jahiri and Sejfullahu or not in regard to the wrong parking of his vehicle. The minister Demiri, being a high government official, who is paid from the Kosovo tax payers, is obliged to inform the public opinion for the payment of his fine, and in case he fails to do so, then the public should be informed in regard to this matter by the KP itself.

⁹ Phone conversation with Mr. Arbër Zeka, Inspectorate of the Kosovo Police, 11 March 2016

¹⁰ Zëri: Minister charged, police officers suspended (VIDEO), 12 February 2016, <http://zeri.info/kronika/75939/denuan-ministrin-u-suspenduan-policet-video>

Parliamentary Oversight

During the period from November 2015 until March 2016, the Parliamentary Committee on Internal Affairs, Security and Supervision of the Kosovo Security Forces held four meetings, and that on 20 November 2015, 22 December 2015, 4 February 2016, and on 9 March 2016.

In the meeting held on 20 November 2015, as far as the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Police are concerned, before the Committee it was reported by Drita Xheladini, Director of Budget and Finances in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Bekim Demiri from the State Agency for Protection of the Personal Data, Mexhid Dragusha, Head of the Division of Budget at the Kosovo Police, Esat Hasolli, Head of Finances at IKP and Ismail Smakiqi from the Kosovo Academy for Public Security.

In this Committee it was reported about the approved budget from the Government for the MIA and it was emphasised that the budget if MIA is decreased for 5.59 %. The decrease of the budget for MIA was presented as a concern by its officials, as this budget cannot cover some of the projects of MIA and Police. Mexhid Dragusha emphasised that diminishing the budget for the KP hinders the achieving of objectives for the Kosovo Police, and this decrease of the budget creates implications also at the international cooperation level, since the Kosovo Police aims at becoming a member of the Interpol and Europol. Another implication, according to Ismail Smakiqi, is also at the Kosovo Academy for Public Security, as there is a need for an increase of training for the KP for 30%, something that will automatically increase also the need for additional goods and services. According to Esat Hasolli, even IKP shall have difficulties in extending its mission due to the shrink made to the budget.

Also the Member of the Parliament Anton Quni raised the issue that during the mandate of the last government, during the supervision of the financial expenditures for MIA and Police, the working group had encountered misuses, and that no additional information were found in regard to these.¹¹

Meanwhile, at the meeting held on 2 December 2015, as far as the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Police are concerned, the agenda included also the report with recommendations for monitoring the implementation of Law No. 04/L-076 on Police, which was prepared by members of the parliament who are members of the Committee. A report with recommendations was presented by Mr. Nuredin Ibishi, and this had to do with the supervision of the Law on Police, field visits, public hearings and other activities. The Committee issued 17 recommendations to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Police and IKP. The following is a summary of the recommendations of these three institutions: the continued need to increase the capacity and the level of supervision and cooperation in carrying out the duties and legal powers; Police officers should be included in certified programs of education and trainings in regard to recognition and enforcement of the provisions foreseen by the applicable laws; under the competences of the MIA, through memorandums, agreements or other acts of cooperation, the relationship between the police and other agencies of law enforcement in Kosovo should be strengthened and become functional; the Judicial Police should be considered to be established, and also the promotion system needs to be reformed, and the police should be released from the high level of secondary activities; MIA and Kosovo Police should increase international police cooperation and Kosovo police should join regional and international organizations and police security.

The Parliamentary Committee on Internal Affairs, Security and Supervision of the Kosovo Security Forces has also held a meeting on 4 February 2016, where the agenda included also the review of the Committee's Work Plan for 2016. For the Committee it should be noted the concern expressed by Mr. Antom Quni, that the situation in the Kosovo Assembly and the


¹¹ The Committee on Internal Affairs, Security and Supervision of the Kosovo Security Forces, 20 November 2015, http://www.assembly-kosova.org/common/docs/proc/proc_2015_11_20_10_6214_al.pdf

violent protests that have occurred during this time, made the Kosovo police with all the capabilities that are available, focus on protests, something that has shifted the attention from other threatening issues.


The trust of the Kosovo citizens in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Kosovo Police, and Parliamentary Committee on Internal Affairs, Security and Supervision of the Kosovo Security Forces

The citizens who responded to the survey in February 2016 had the chance to express in numbers their level of trust for the institutions or the leaders of the institutions, and that from 1 to 5, where 1 stood for the lowest level of trust and 5 the highest level of trust.

When comparing the surveys from July 2015, November 2015 and February 2016 in regard to the general trust for the Ministry of Internal Affairs, we have noted a continuous decrease of this trust. In the other hand, the Kosovo Police has had a slight increase compared to November 2015. Whereas, the Parliamentary Committee on Internal Affairs, Security and Supervision of the Kosovo Security Forces has remained under the same level of trust as in November 2015.




As far as the trust from different ethnic groups is concerned, it is estimated that the Albanians trust the Police more compared to other communities. In the other hand, other communities trust more the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Parliamentary Committee on Internal Affairs, Security and Supervision of the Kosovo Security Forces, to be followed by the Albanian




community, whereas the Serbian ethnic community has the minimal level of trust towards them.

The Albanian residents living in the North of Kosovo have the highest trust in the Kosovo Police, whereas the Minister of Internal Affairs and the Parliamentary Committee on Internal Affairs, Security and Supervision of the Kosovo Security Forces enjoy the lowest level of trust.




Whereas, Serbian residents living in the South and North of Kosovo have the highest trust in the Kosovo Police, whereas the Minister of Internal Affairs and the Parliamentary Committee enjoy the minimal level of trust.




The trust as per region is as in the following:

Kosovo Police has the highest trust in the whole territory of Kosovo, and the highest values are obtained from Ferizaj, Peja and Prishtina. The second institution to enjoy a high trust in the region is the Parliamentary Committee on Internal Affairs, Security and Supervision of the Kosovo Security Forces, whereas the Minister of Internal Affairs enjoys the lowest level of trust.



As far as the trust per region and ethnicities is concerned, Kosovo Police enjoys the highest trust among other communities, and the highest percentage is found in the Municipalities of Peja, Ferizaj and Prishtina. The trust in the Kosovo Police is followed by the Albanian community, with the highest percentage in Ferizaj and Gjilan, and also the Serbian community has a high level of trust in the Kosovo Police, especially in the region of Ferizaj and Prishtina.

A very interesting result is the trust of the Albanian community as well as other communities in the Parliamentary Committee, which in all region, except for Gjakova, is higher compared to the trust that these communities have in the Minister of the Internal Affairs. In the other hand the Serbian community has a low trust in the Minister of the Internal Affairs, whereas the trust of this community for the Parliamentary Committee is almost non-existent.



2. THE MONITORING OF THE SECURITY FORCE SECTOR

Introduction

During the reporting period from 15 November 2015 until 15 March 2016 the key public events that dominated the Sector of the Kosovo Security Forces (KSF) are without any doubt the publication of the Annual Report for 2015 from the Ministry of the KSF as well as the approval of the National Program for the Application of the Agreement on Stabilization and Association in the Assembly of Kosovo, which determines the legislative obligations and the propitiatory measures for this sector.

In this case, in this section the anomalies of the legislative process and the policy-making in preparation of the transformation of KSF into the Kosovo Armed Forces (KAF) are addressed.

The Ministry of KSF for more than a year has processed in the Kosovo Government the draft law for amending and supplementing the law on the Kosovo Armed Forces, and that without making the relevant constitutional amendments, while, on the other hand, it has drafted several strategic documents on defence without drafting and approving Kosovo National Strategy on Defence, from which, methodologically, would have derived all the accompanying strategic documents on defence and the security of the country.

Also this section shall handle the part of the work of the Parliamentary Committee on Internal Affairs, Security and Supervision of the Kosovo Security Forces, which is related to the Kosovo Security Forces. In the end an analysis is made in regard to the trends of trust of the citizens of Kosovo in regard to Minister of KSF and the KSF itself.

Anomalies in preparation of the transformation of KSF into KAF

The identified anomalies in the preparation to transform KSF into KAF interlock in themselves two substantial components of this process, and that the legislative one and the doctrinal one.

As far as the legislative component is concerned, the Ministry of the Kosovo Security Forces, same as stated in the 2015 Annual Report,¹² dated 2 march 2015, the draft law for amending and supplementing the law on the Kosovo Armed Forces, has been proceeded for approval with the Government of Kosovo, by applying in this way the Legislative Program of the Government in 2015, and that one month earlier its deadline.¹³

¹² Ministry of the Kosovo Security Force, 2015 Annual Report, point 1.1 Application of the legislative annual plan, http://www.mksf-ks.org/repository/docs/Raporti_Vjeotr_2015_shqFINALll_compressed_1_.pdf

¹³ XIII, Ministry of the Kosovo Security Force, Draft-Law for amending and supplementing the laws related to the Kosovo Armed Forces, Deadline for submitting it 31.03.2015, Government of Kosovo, Legislative Program for 2015, Decision No. 02/06, 14.01.2015, <http://kryeministri->

However, the Government, in the same legislative program had foreseen, surprisingly that the draft amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo that would enable the transformation of KSF in the KAF, to be completed two months after the draft law in question was proceeded, namely on 30 June 2015. Such legislative planning represents a procedural anomaly, since the draft law amending the laws dealing with KAF, are preceded by the relevant constitutional draft amendments that would allow the transformation of KSF into KAF, rather than having a reverse order of these steps.

However, the Government of Kosovo, with its decision dated 27.05.2015¹⁴ it had proposed to the Assembly of Kosovo the amendment of the Constitution in order to make the necessary amendments to enable the transformation of the KSF into KAF. The preceding of the draft amendments in the Assembly of Kosovo is stuck due to the lack of the willingness from the side of the deputies from the Serbian List to support the transformation of KSF into KAF.

Furthermore, the 2016 Legislative Program of the Government of Kosovo foresees the re-proceeding of the draft-law for the amendment of the laws related to the Kosovo Armed Forces, which should be delivered up to the date of 30 November 2016.¹⁵ This draft law foresees the fulfilment of the legislative obligations which flow from the National Program for the Application of the Agreement on Association and Stabilization, which was approved at the Kosovo Assembly on 10 March 2016.¹⁶

ks.net/repository/docs/PROJEKTPROGRAMI_LEGJISLATIV_PER_VITIN_2015_VERSIONI_FINAL.PDF, f. 9-10

¹⁴ Government of the Republic of Kosovo, Decision No. 01/31, [http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/repository/docs/Vendimet_e_Mbledhjes_se_31-te_te_Qeverise_se_Republikes_se_Kosoves_2015_\(2\).pdf](http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/repository/docs/Vendimet_e_Mbledhjes_se_31-te_te_Qeverise_se_Republikes_se_Kosoves_2015_(2).pdf), 27.05 2015

¹⁵ XII, Ministry of the Kosovo Security Force, Draft-Law for amending and supplementing the laws related to the Kosovo Armed Forces, Deadline for submitting it 31.03.2015, Government of Kosovo, Legislative Program for 2016 Decision 01/70, 15.01.2016, http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/repository/docs/PROGRAMI_LEGJISLATIV_PER_VITIN_2016_FINAL-BMK.pdf

¹⁶ Government of the Republic of Kosovo, National Program for the Implementation of the Agreement on Association and Stabilization, March 2016, http://www.mci-ks.net/repository/docs/1_pkzmsa_miratuar nga kuvendi_final.pdf

The National Program for the Implementation of the Agreement on Association and Stabilization (NPIAAS), for 2016 foresees these legislative measures that are related to the transformation of the KSF to KAF¹⁷:

- a) The amendment of the Constitution of Kosovo for the new mission of KSF, respectively for the transformation of the Kosovo Armed Forces;
- b) The approval of the draft law for amending and supplementing the law on the Kosovo Armed Forces, - whose purpose is the determination of the new mission of the Kosovo Armed Forces, for the protection of the integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Kosovo, its restructuring as well as the role and competence of the chain of the civil and democratic control of these forces;
- c) The Law for Commissary of the Kosovo Armed Forces

The first two legislative measures of National Program for the Implementation of the Agreement on Association and Stabilization were foreseen also by the 2015 Legislative Program of the Government of the Republic of Kosovo, but their approval is stuck in place, and the same applies also to the Law for the Commissioner for the Armed Forces of Kosovo, if within this year an agreement is not reached with the Serbian List in regard to the amendment of the Kosovo Constitution.

Whereas as far as the implementation measures are concerned, the National Program for the Implementation of the Agreement on Association and Stabilization foresee also the National Security Strategy and the approval of the Defence Strategy, for which it is emphasised rightfully that it is a derivate of the National Security Strategy¹⁸. However, it is exactly the specification of these implementation measures that highlights the methodological anomalies in the process of formulating the defence policies of the Ministry of KSF, which, despite the fact that Kosovo has no National Security Strategy, in 2015 it managed to develop the Concept of the Defence

¹⁷ Ibid., f.32

¹⁸ Ibid.

Strategy, Revision of the Draft of the General Doctrine and the Review of the Defence White Paper.¹⁹

This way, now the task of forming the National Security Strategy falls over the Security Council of Kosovo, which has the legal obligation to draft this fundamental document for the security of Kosovo²⁰, and this Strategy should further be approved in the Assembly of Kosovo. Consequently, upon the eventual approval of the National Security Strategy, KSF or KAF shall be obliged to redraft all the above stated documents in regard to the policies related to the defence.

Despite the fact the Ministry of KSF has moved ahead of time in drafting the strategic defence documents, by concluding in this way a large part of the work, yet, the eventual assistance of NATO for the transformation of the KSF into KAF can be damaged by some of the formulation provided on the 2015 Annual Report. Under point 2.2 of the 2015 Annual Report²¹ for the development of the preparatory and planning process for the transformation of the MKSF into the Ministry of Defence and KSF into the Kosovo Armed Forces, it is stated that this process is assisted with the technical and professional assistance and the professional support of NATO Advisory Team (NAT) as well as the NATO Advisory Liaising Team (NALT).

Taking into consideration the fact that none of these advising teams of NATO has the mandate to support the transformation of KSF into KAF²², the emphasis in the report that the transformation of KSF into KAF has their support, is rather concerning and it damages the credibility of the Ministry of the KSF in its relations with NATO, for what the representatives of NAT expressed their concerns to KIPRED.²³

¹⁹ Ministry of the Kosovo Security Force, Annual Report 2015, Point 2.1 Review process and drafting of strategic documents, http://www.mksf-ks.org/repository/docs/Raporti_Vjeotr_2015_shqFINALll_compressed_1.pdf

²⁰ Article 2.1 Law on Security Council of Kosovo, http://www.assembly-kosova.org/common/docs/ligjet/2008_03-L050_al.pdf

²¹ Ministry of the Kosovo Security Force, Annual Report 2015, http://www.mksf-ks.org/repository/docs/Raporti_Vjeotr_2015_shqFINALll_compressed_1.pdf

²² Shih responsibilities of NAT and NATL, NATO's Role in Kosovo: KFOR Tasks, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm

²³ Takim i KIPRED-it me përfaqësues të NAT, Prishtinë, 14 mars 2016.

The Oversight of the Parliamentary Committee


During this reporting period the Parliamentary Committee on Internal Affairs, Security and Supervision of the Kosovo Security Forces held three meetings, in which it handled KSF matters and that on 20 November 2015, 4 February 2016, and 9 March 2016. In the meeting held on 20 November 2015, it was reviewed the draft-budget of the KSF for the year of 2016, which was referred by Mr. Shkëlzen Sylaj, Secretary General of KSF; In the meeting held on 4 February it was reviewed the Work Plan of the Committee for 2016m whereas in the meeting held on 9 March 2016 the Commander of KSF General Lieutenant Rrahman Rama presented the 2015 Annual Report for KSF.

A disputable matter, which is left unanswered, is the representation of the Bosnian community in the KSF, which was raised again by the deputy Qerim Bajrami in the meeting held on 4 February 2016. To clarify this issue, it would be useful to organize a joint meeting with the Parliamentary Committee, the Minister of KSF, the Commander of KSF and the Office for Communities in the KSF. Also, an issue that needs to be further clarified is the one raised by the deputy Nuredin Ibishi at the very same meeting, in regard to the legality in purchasing 24 vehicles from the KSF.

The work of the Parliamentary Committee for the supervision of the KSF, for the first time since the beginning of communicating the Progress Report on Kosovo by the European Commission in 2005, it was treated by the Country Reports on Kosovo which was presented in Brussels on the 10th November 2015. The report noted major shortcomings of the Committee, emphasizing the fact that there has been a limited progress in the oversight of the KSF, and it considers as problematic the close relation of individual deputies with the former members of KLA and Kosovo Protection Corps, who are preventing the independent assessments of the KSF.²⁴

²⁴Kosovo Country Report 2015, European Commission, SWD (2015) 215 final, Brussels, 10.11.2015, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2015/20151110_report_kosovo.pdf, f.9.

This finding of the European Commission is emphasised couple of time only by the deputy Anton Quni, and that during the three meetings that were held during this reporting time period, whereat KSF was handled. However, so far the Committee has not held any meeting in order to address the findings and recommendations of the European Commission for the Report for Kosovo.




The trust of the Kosovo citizens in the Ministry of the Security Force and the Kosovo Security Force

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
As far as the general trust of Kosovo citizens is concerned, the Kosovo Security Force enjoys the highest trust if citizens compared to the Minister of KSF, and this trend continues to be the same as of July 2015.

If we compare the surveys form July 2015, November 2015 and February 2016 in regard to the general trust citizens' trust for the Kosovo Security Force and its Minister, we notice that in February 2016 there is slight increase of the trust compared to November 2015, however the level of trust from July 2015 is not yet reached


As far as the trust from different ethnic groups is concerned, it is estimated that the Albanians trust the Kosovo Security Forces more, to be followed by other communities, whereas the Serbian community has the minimal level of trust. In the other hand, other communities trust more the Minister of the Kosovo Security Forces, to be followed by the Albanian community. The Serbian ethnic community has the minimal level of trust towards the Minister of the Kosovo Security Forces.




The Albanian residents living in the North of Kosovo have the highest trust in the Kosovo Security Force, whereas their trust to the Minister of KSF remains slightly over the minimal level.




Whereas as far as the measurement of the Serbian residents living in the South and the North of Kosovo provide an outcome of minimal trust towards the Ministry of the Kosovo Security Force and KSF.



According to regions, Kosovo Security Force enjoys the highest level of trust in Ferizaj, Peja and Prizren, whereas the Minister of KSF has the highest trust in the region of Ferizaj and Prishtina. The trust of citizen in the North of Kosovo is slightly over the minimal.



As far as the trust per region and ethnicities is concerned, it is noticed that the highest trust of Albanians in KSF is in the region of Ferizaj, Gjilan and Prishtina, to be followed by the other communities. Whereas, the trust in the Ministry of KSF is listed the second among the Albanian community with the highest percentage found in Ferzaj and Prishtina, to be followed by the other communities. The Serbian community in the other hand has a minimum level of trust towards both the Minister of KSF and KSF itself.



3. THE MONITORING OF THE INTELLIGENCE SECTOR

Introduction

The security clearance is one of the most sensitive issues of the credibility and functionality of the security sector in Kosovo, and in the legal aspect this is regulated through the Law on Classification of Information and Security Clearances as well as the Law on Kosovo Intelligence Agency. However, the practical application of this legal framework has caused apprehensions to the political and institutional actors, including the Assembly of Kosovo, but also to the European Commission.

The system of the security clearance in Kosovo was led up to 2010 by the international administration. With the approval of the Law on Classification of Information and Security Clearances (2010), this competence was passed to the Kosovo Intelligence Agency, which had created under its authority a special department related to this matter. The exercising of these competences brought several stagnations in the process, to be followed with practical and political problems, hence even the European Commission itself, in its reports from 2014 and 2015, expressed its concerns regarding the way security was being cleared.

The debate for institutional regulation of this matter continues to be open, and not a few alternatives have already been identified such as the creation of an independent agency for security clearance, then, the transfer of the security clearance department within the Security Council of Kosovo, as well as the alternative of transferring this Department to the Office of the Kosovo Prime Minister.

The handling of this problem in this analysis aims at resolving the political and institutional debate in regard to this very significant matter of the security sector in Kosovo.

The system of security clearance in Kosovo

The security clearance is a procedure through which it is determined whether a person is considered to represent an acceptable security risk for the state, in that way that based on this estimation it is decided whether a security certificate is to issued or not. The security clearance procedure is based on the two laws: Law No. 03/L-178, Law on Classification of Information and Security Clearances²⁵ as well as Law No. 03/L- 063, the Law on Kosovo Intelligence Agency.²⁶

²⁵Law on Classification of Information and Security Clearances, <http://www.aki-rks.org/RKS/2010-178-alb.pdf>.

²⁶Law on Kosovo Intelligence Agency, http://www.aki-rks.org/2008_03-L063_al.pdf.

The Law No. 03/L-178, Law on Classification of Information and Security Clearances stipulates the purpose and scope of clearances, categories of classification of information, the levels of authorities for classification and establishment of a vetting authority. According to paragraph 1 of Article 22 of this Law a person may have access to information classified as “confidential”, “secret” or “top secret” provided that that person (1) has a valid security certificate; (2) has a need-to-know for carrying out his/her official mission or duty; and (3) has signed an approved nondisclosure statement. Whereas under paragraph 2 of this article it is emphasised that only the President of the Republic of Kosovo, the President of the Assembly of Kosovo and the Prime Minister are authorized to access classified information for the purpose of discharging their official duties without fulfilling the requirements set out in paragraph 1 of this Article provided they have a need to have this information.

This allows us to understand that apart from the President of the Republic of Kosovo, the President of the Assembly of Kosovo and the Prime Minister, all other officials of the Kosovo institutions, including the ones elected by the people – the members of the parliament, Kosovo Police Officers, Kosovo Security Force officers, are not authorized to have access to the classified information, without fulfilling the requirements set out in paragraph 1 of Article 22 of the Law on Classification of Information and Security Clearances.

According to Article 24 of the Law on Classification of Information and Security Clearances, “the Kosovo Intelligence Agency (KIA) shall be the Vetting Authority responsible for conducting security clearance procedures as set out in this Law for all public authorities of the Republic of Kosovo and their contractors.”, and in this case KIA shall establish a special Vetting Department exclusively responsible for conducting security clearance procedures[...], and also that, “Requests for conducting a security clearance shall be submitted by the respective head of public authority in writing to the head of the Vetting Department specifying the classification level for which security clearance is required.”

The Vetting Authority – respectively the Department on Security Clearances, pursuant to Article 25 of this Law, shall issue a security certificate to a person only if such person, after having conducted a security clearance procedure in accordance with this Law, has been determined to be an acceptable security risk. The security certificate that is issued shows clearly the level that the cleared person has access to the classified information.

Apart from the General Rules on Security Clearance Procedures set out in Article 27 of this Law, Article 28 regulates also the rights of the person undergoing a security clearance, whereat in paragraph 1 of this article it is stated that “In the event that the security clearance procedure gives reasons to believe that the person is an unacceptable security risk, that person shall be given the opportunity to be heard before a decision is made.” Whereas according to paragraph 4 of this article, A person who has been found to be an unacceptable security risk shall be issued a decision in writing denying the issuance of a security certificate. Such person may file an appeal against the decision within fifteen (15) days from the day he/she has been notified of the decision [...]”.

The parliamentary oversight of KIA, which also covers clearance matters, it is conducted by the Parliamentary Committee for the Supervision of KIA, whose mandate is determined through the Law No. 03/L-063 on KIA, 2008 year, including also the handling of cases of doubt related to the legality of KIA employees conduct.

Concerns regarding the implementation of the security clearance

The highest institutional leader of Kosovo, who had initially expressed his concerns regarding the security clearance, was the former President of the Assembly of Kosovo Mr. Jakup Krasniqi, who expressed his doubts regarding the members of the Parliamentary Committee for the Supervision of KIA and had thereto required thereto their clearance to be conducted by KIA.²⁷

²⁷ Krasniqi: The deputies for the committee on KIA should be cleared
<http://www.noa.al/mob/index.php?type=artikull&id=346673.html#sthash.GW0YJ210.dpuf>.

However, the credibility of the security clearance by KIA underwent a severe outbreak in April 2014 when it was disclosed that one of the high officials of KIA did not finish his high school at all. With a diploma, subject of doubts for falsification, he was not only initially hired in the Kosovo Police, but later also to the Kosovo Intelligence Agency, but moreover he had managed to finish his University studies and be enrolled into Master's.²⁸ With this it was questioned the correctness of the assessment of the clearance that KIA had applied or was applying with the other institutions in Kosovo.

The process of the security clearance for the members of the Kosovo Police (KP) began in October 2012.²⁹ Up to the beginning of last year the clearance certificate was rejected to 25 police officers, who field their appeals with the justice institutions.³⁰ This issue soon reached the agenda of the Parliamentary Committee for the Supervision of KIA and in the meeting held on 29 April 2015 the members of this committee concluded that the two fundamental institutions for the security in the country, the KP and the KIA, had declared their "war" against one another, as an excuse that some senior officials of the Kosovo Police had not passed the clearance.³¹

The former member of that Committee, Burim Ramadani, had maintained that such a clash between KP and KIA had its origin in the clearance of some of the KP officials, whose results had come out negative,³² and furthermore requesting to discharge these persons with a negative clearance, giving them also no access to the confidential documents.³³

In the other hand, the former President of the Committee for the Supervision of KIA, Florin Krasniqi, had expressed his concerns regarding the clearance process for the officials of the

²⁸ KIA official with no high school manages to finish university, 25 April 2014, <http://koha.net/?id=27&l=7641>.

²⁹ KIA verifies the biographies of police officers, under strainer there are approx. 100 thousand Kosovars, 21 December 2012, <http://koha.net/?id=8&arkiva=1&l=128305>.

³⁰ Muharrem Roberti, QKSS, short document of politicians "Security Clearance", Prishtinë, 2 March 2015, p. 9.

³¹ Kosovo Police and KIA have declared war to one another, 29 April 2014, <http://www.kosovalive360.com/policia-e-kosoves-dhe-aki-ja-i-kane-shpallur-lufte-njera-tjetres.html>.

³² Kosovo Police and KIA have declared war to one another, 29 April 2014, <http://www.kosovalive360.com/policia-e-kosoves-dhe-aki-ja-i-kane-shpallur-lufte-njera-tjetres.html>.

³³ Security institutions have no room for those who did not pass the security clearance, 12 March 2014, <http://www.kosovalive360.com/ne-institucione-te-sigurise-ska-vend-per-ata-nuk-e-kaluan-verifikimin.html>.

institutions of the country, stating that all those officials who had not passed the security clearance can appeal in writing to the Parliamentary Committee for KIA. He had confirmed that the Committee had already received 17 appeals from the people who did not pass the security clearance of KIA.³⁴ Most of these officers were from KP, and they had already appealed with the respective Basic Court, however up to now they have not received any official response in regard to their appeals.³⁵

Concerns in regard to the security clearances of the KP were recently expressed also by Mr. Rexhep Selimi, member of the parliament from Vetëvendosje, who considered the stagnation of this process as a political intervention. He stated that by not passing the security clearance the police officers are being subject of blackmailing from the politics. "By not passing the security clearance, the police officers are being blackmailed in order to apply the political orders. It the indispensable timing for the Police to reflect and apply the Law on Police as well as the other laws of Kosovo," as maintained by Mr. Selimi.³⁶

In the other hand the (lack of) clearance of the members of the Parliamentary Committee for the Supervision of KIA and the heads of appointed institutions, remains another divisive issue that has encountered oppositions from some members of the Committee. According to Chairman of the Committee, Mr. Shala, the clearance is and must be crucial, because at any time when Kosovo is going to join international security organizations, the clearance is going to be mandatory.³⁷

Furthermore, in the 2014 Progress Report, the European Commission has expressed its concern regarding the supervision of KIA by the Parliamentary Committee, by stressing that the clearance conducted by KIA continues to be non-professional and biased, and it requested from

³⁴ Security clearance from KIA, 17 official appeal <http://www.telegrafi.com/verifikimi-i-sigurise-nga-aki-ja-ankohen-17-zyrtare/>.

³⁵ Interview with the Head of the Parliamentary Committee for the Supervision of KIA, Haxhi Shala, 30 march 2016

³⁶ Rexhep Selimi: many police officers failed to pass the security clearance, 24 January 2016, <http://www.gazetaexpress.com/lajme/rexhep-selimi-shume-police-nuk-e-kane-te-kaluar-verifikimin-e-sigurise-162341/?archive=1>.

³⁷ Interview with the head of the Parliamentary Committee for the Supervision of KIA, Haxhi Shala, 22 march 2016.

the Kosovo Assembly to upraise the capacities and improve the expertise for supervision in this field.³⁸ Whereas in the 2015 Report it is emphasised that the clearance is still being conducted KIA, proving the recommendation for that to be directed by another independent body.³⁹

As far as the institutional transfer of competences regarding the clearance and issuing of clearance certificates are concerned, the institutional representatives of Kosovo have pointed out several options. In the interview with the Head of the Parliamentary Committee for the Supervision of KIA, Mr. Haxhi Shala, KIPRED was informed that this matter has been handled in the Committee and that Shala had officially required not to keep the Vetting Authority under the KIA, and that this competences should be eventually transferred to the Kosovo Assembly or the Government.

Whereas the Security Advisor of the Prime Minister, Mr. Edon Miftari, has stated that the Vetting Authority will be relocated to the Office of the Prime Minister of Kosovo.⁴⁰ In the other hand, Mr. Afrim Haxhiu, Secretary of the Secretariat for the Kosovo Security, recommended the Vetting Authority to be transferred to the Security Council, as it is also the practice of some of the regional countries.⁴¹

However, even despite the fact that several alternatives have been pointed out for institutional transfer of the vetting authority from KIA, for this matter no proper debate has been held in the Assembly of Kosovo, and this has not been followed by any structural public debate.

In this case it should be taken into consideration that if these competences are transferred to the Office of the Prime Minister, then it is hardly going to be handled independently. Hence, the valid option for the implementation of the recommendations of the 2015 Report from the

³⁸ European Commission, Kosovo Progress Report 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2014/20141008-kosovo-progress-report_en.pdf, fq. 12.

³⁹ European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Kosovo 2015 Report, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2015/20151110_report_kosovo.pdf, fq 9-10.

⁴⁰ Interview with the Advisor for National Security in the Office of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Kosovo, Edon Miftari, 4 November 2015

⁴¹ Interview with Mr. Afrim Haxhiu, Secretary of the Secretariat of the Security Council of Kosovo, 22 October 2015 .

European Commission remains the creation of an independent agency, which would act beyond the institutional subordinated authorities, or the transfer of these competences within the structures of the Kosovo Security Council

Parliamentary Oversight

During the period November 2015 until March 2016, the Parliamentary Committee for the Supervision of KIA gathered five times, and that four times in February and once in March 2016.⁴²


On the 9 February, the meeting where the Director of KIA Agron Selimaj it was supposed to report, failed due to the lack of the quorum that was caused as a result of boycotting committee meetings by the opposition as well as a result of the absence of vice-president of Duda Balje, information provided by the members of the parliament that she could not participate in the Committee.⁴³ The reporting of the KIA Director, Mr. Selimaj was made on 29 February behind closed doors. In the meetings of the Committee, held on 2 and 16 February, it was discussed, reviewed and approved the work plan of the committee for the year of 2016, whereas in the meeting held on 21 March, Shkelzen Sopjani, KIA General Inspector was invited to report.

It is worth to mention that all meetings of the Committee were held with closed doors to the media and the public opinion. It remains worrisome the fact that the Committee makes no press release after concluding its meetings, and that it continues to be the parliamentary committee with the lowest public accountability in the Assembly of Ksoovo.

⁴² Committee for the Suprevision of KIA, "Meetings", <http://www.kuvendikosoves.org/?cid=1,110,131>

⁴³ The meeting of Committee for the Suprevision of KIA fails, 9 Feb 2016, <http://www.kosovapress.com/sq/siguri/desh-ton-mbledhja-e-komisionit-per-mbikeqyrjen-e-aki-se-63911/>.


The trust of the citizens in the Kosovo Intelligence Agency, the Director of the Kosovo Intelligence Agency and the Parliamentary Committee for Supervision of Kosovo Intelligence Agency



The citizens were questioned through a survey in the February 2016 and they had the chance to express in numbers their level of trust for the institutions or the leaders of the institutions, and that in a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 stood for the lowest level of trust and 5 the highest level of trust.

When we compare the survey from February 2016 with the survey from July – November 2015 in regard to the general trust in the institutions of the intelligence sector, we see a relatively similar trend with November 2015, with an exception to the Parliamentary Committee for Supervision of Kosovo Intelligence Agency, who has had a slight decrease of the trust.



On the same question regarding the trust of KIA, the Director of the Kosovo Intelligence Agency and the Parliamentary Committee for Supervision of KIA, the highest trust is noticed with other communities, to be followed by the Albanian community, whereas the Serbian community has the lowest level of trust.



As far as the Albanian residents in the North of Kosovo are concerned is very low. Here the Director of KIA enjoys a slightly higher trust, whereas KIA and the Parliamentary Committee for KIA enjoy a slightly lower trust.


Whereas, the members of the Serbian community regardless of the territory of Kosovo where they reside have almost no trust towards the above stated institutions.

As far as the trust by Kosovo regions, along with the minimal level of trust found in the North of Kosovo, Prizren has given relatively higher estimations. Also, compared to other regions of Kosovo, it is noticed an approximate level of trust in Gjakova, Peja and Gjilan, with an approximate estimation which is slightly lower that the trust expressed for other places of Kosovo.



As far as the trust in the KIA, Director of KIA, and the Parliamentary Committee for KIA, is concerned, based on regions and ethnic groups, the Kosovo Serbian community in Kosovo, regardless of location, they continue to have almost no trust. Meanwhile, non-majority

communities in Kosovo, in general, have higher trust in these institutions, along with the majority Albanian community, in almost all regions (except for Mitrovica).



4. THE (LACK OF) PUBLIC TRANSPARENCY OF THE KOSOVO INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

What lessons can be learned from the practices of the Western Balkan States, Central Europe States and the Baltic States?

Introduction

The Kosovo Intelligence Agency (KIA) was established by Kosovo Assembly on 21 May 2008 with the approval of Law Nr. 03/L-063. Practically its foundation started on 5 May 2009, with the appointment of Mr. Bashkim Smakaj as the first director of this institution. However, KIA needed more than six years to take the first steps towards the public transparency, through the launching of its website on March 27 2015.⁴⁴ None the less, KIA website (www.aki-rks.org)

⁴⁴KIA starts well, opens a website, Indeks online, 27 March 2015, <http://www.indeksonline.net/?PageID=2&LajmID=150722>

offers only little information, apart from those that can be found on the public domain, respectively on the legal framework, data in regard to the chief of the agency, notification's section (which contains a very few notifications), and the contact section⁴⁵.

It's also worrying the fact that the KIA enjoys among the Kosovo's citizens the lowest level of trust compared to all the other security institutions⁴⁶. Even though the reasons for such a low level of trust can be only presupposed, we can not deny the fact that the growth of KIA's public transparency on one hand could influence the growth of this trust and on the other hand it would enable the growth of the public accountability, which would increase the level of democratic governance of the security sector in general.

In order to identify the advanced practices of the transparency of the internal intelligence agencies, whose applications would enable the growth of the citizen's trust as the result of KIA transparency's improvement and public accountability, KIPRED has developed a comparative research in three regions, including the countries of the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Kosovo, Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Serbia), Central Europe (Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia) and the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), which had different successive steps in the transitioning process from the communist dictatorships to democratic states.

This research has addressed the websites contents of the respective countries' intelligence agencies, based on the fact whether these data provided or not the following: a) legal framework, b) organizational structure, c) budget, d) annual reports, and e) press releases.

⁴⁵Hereby, KIPRED thanks the KIA for all updated and answers received for the written interviews through the contact's section .

⁴⁶ See the section: The brief analytical overview of the Public Opinion Research, on the Security Sector Observers Nr.1, 2 and 3.

Based on the best practices of the countries of these regions, at the end of this research paper recommendations are given by KIPRED for the growth of the transparency and public accountability for the Kosovos Intelligence Agency.

The public transparency of the internal intelligence agencies: The practices of the Western Balkan countries

This section will handle the public transparency practices, respectively the data found on the internal intelligence agencies of Albania (State Information Service – SHISH)⁴⁷, Bosnia and Hercegovina (Security Information Agency of Bosnia and Hercegovina – OSA/OBA)⁴⁸, Croatia (Security Information Agency – OSA)⁴⁹, Macedonia (Information Agency – AR)⁵⁰, Montenegro (The Agency of National Security – ANB)⁵¹ and Serbia (Security Information Agency – BIA).⁵²

The following table gives an overview of the (not) given data on the internal intelligence agencies of the Western Balkan countries, which may serve for another comparative treatment of the public transparency of these agencies.

All these agencies on their websites have presented their Missions and the Legal Framework, which regulate their actions and functioning, as well as the section for Press Release (except for BH). But, regarding the presentations of the organizational structure, the budgets and annual reports, there is a great difference among the agencies of the same region countries.

The Security Information Agency of Bosnia and Hercegovina and the Kosovo Intelligence Agency have the lowest level of public transparency, since they have not presented any of them. After them, it follows the State Information Service of Albania, which has presented only

⁴⁷The official website of State Information Service - SHISH: <http://www.shish.gov.al/index.html>

⁴⁸The official website of Security Information Agency of BH – OSA/OBA: <http://www.osa-oba.gov.ba/>

⁴⁹The official Website of the Security Information Agency - SOA: <https://www.soa.hr/hr>

⁵⁰The official Website of the Information Agency – AR: http://ia.gov.mk/index_en.html

⁵¹The Website of the National Security Agency – ANB: <http://www.anb.gov.me/naslovna>

⁵²The Website of the Security Information Agency – BIA: <http://www.bia.gov.rs/index-rsl.html>

the organizational structure, The Agency of National Security of Montenegro, which has presented only the public procurement data, Information Agency of Macedonia, which has presented the budget and the organizational structure, Information Agency of Serbia, which has presented the structure, the budget and the public procurement, while the highest level of general transparency has the Information Agency of Croatia, which on its website has presented the organizational structure, the budget and the annual reports.

State	Name of the Agency	Mission	Legal Framework	Organizational Structure	Budget	Annual Report	Press Release
Albania	State Information Service	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Security Information Agency of BH	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Kosovo	Kosovo Intelligence Agency	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Croatia	Security Information Agency	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Montenegro	National Security Agency	Yes	Yes	No	No (Public Procurement Contracts)	No	Yes
Macedonia	Information Agency	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Serbia	Security Information Agency	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes

However for the identification of the best practices it is necessary to conduct a thorough training regarding the manner of presenting the budgets and the annual reports.

Regarding the budgeting transparency, the Security Information Agency of Serbia (BIA) has the highest level when compared with the other countries of the region. The BIA website provides the following: the Annual Report with its relevant budget lines⁵³, (although not fully detailed), the public procurement contracts⁵⁴, and the Report of the State Audit Institution⁵⁵. After that it follows the Macedonian Information Agency (RA) which on its website has presented the Annual Budget with its relevant budget lines⁵⁶, while the Security Information of Croatia (SOA), whose budget is presented on the Public Annual Report, on its account's transparency section has the specified total amount of the annual budget, with a classification of the data for the investments in development and modernization and the costs of employees⁵⁷. The Montenegro Agency of National Security (ANB) did not present its budget, but it has presented the public procurement contracts⁵⁸.

⁵³ Budzet za 2015 godinu, Bezbednosno-Informativna Agencija – BIA, <http://www.bia.gov.rs/download/dokumenta/projekcijabudzeta2015.pdf>

⁵⁴ Javne Nabavke, Bezbednosno-Informativna Agencija – BIA, <http://www.bia.gov.rs/rsl/o-agenciji/javne-nabavke.html>

⁵⁵ See: Drzavna Revizorska Institucija Republike Srbije, Izvestaj o Reviziji Godisnjeg Financijskog Izvestaja i Pravilnosti Poslovanja Bezbednosne – Informativne Agencije, <http://www.bia.gov.rs/download/dokumenta/dri2013.pdf>

⁵⁶ Budzet 2015, Agencija za Razuznavanje - RA, http://ia.gov.mk/pdf/BUDZET_2015.pdf

⁵⁷ Transparentnost Proracuna, Javno Izvjesce 2015, Sigurnosno-Obavestajna Agencija- SOA, <https://www.soa.hr/UserFiles/File/pdf/Javno-izvjesce-2015.pdf>, p.p 30.31 Zagreb, 2015

⁵⁸ Javne Nabavke, Agencija za Nacionalnu Bezbednot – ANB, <http://www.anb.gov.me/biblioteka/javne-nabavke>

The Security Information Agency of Croatia (SOA) it's the only internal intelligence agency in the region that has presented the annual public reports on its website. The SOA⁵⁹ Annual Public Report is highly informative for the public and it provides useful data on its work and on the evaluation of security condition in Croatia. This report has this content: a) Data regarding the agency, respectively for the security information system of the Republic of Croatia, the SOA role, it's competences and the direction of its work; b) The evaluation of the security condition in the Republic of Croatia; c) The evaluation of the security condition in the vicinity of the Republic of Croatia, respectively the security conditions with the south-eastern neighbouring countries of Croatia and the belt of insecurity in the European vicinity; d) The work of the SOA through the numbers, the analytical work, security verifications and the counter-intelligence protection, and the security of the protected persons; e) The SOA Leadership, respectively the organization and the structure, the accounts transparency, the leadership with the human potential, the challenges of the agency's leadership and the development of the SOA's skills – the application of the developing plan; f) The overseeing of SOA's work, respectively the external overseeing, the internal overseeing and the responsibility towards the public opinion.

If we look carefully the public transparency practices of the internal intelligence agencies of the Western Balkans, we can conclude that except the website content, legal work frame and the press release section, the level of transparency and accountability is measured with the respective budgeting data, the public procurement and particularly with the publication of annual public reports.

Nevertheless, an interesting fact that needs to be emphasized is that none of the above mentioned internal intelligence agencies of Western Balkans have not given in any document the number of their employees.

⁵⁹ Javno Izvješće 2015, Sigurnosno-Obavestajna Agencija- SOA, <https://www.soa.hr/UserFiles/File/pdf/Javno-izvjesce-2015.pdf>

The public transparency of the internal intelligence agencies: The Central Europe Practices

This section will treat the public transparency practices, respectively the data presented on the internal intelligence agencies websites of Czech Republic (Security Information Service – BIS)⁶⁰, Poland (The Internal Security Agency – ABW)⁶¹ and Slovakia (Slovakia's Information Service – SIS)⁶². These countries are some of the first countries in the Eastern Bloc that have successfully finished the transition which was crowned with their membership in NATO⁶³ and EU⁶⁴.

As it is shown in the below table, the internal intelligence agencies of these countries are characterized with a high level of the general transparency compared to such institutions in the Western Balkans, except Croatia, which is also a member of NATO and EU.⁶⁵ However, here a fact that needs to be emphasized is that compared to the Security Information Agency of Croatia (SOA), the Czech Republic Security Information Service and the Slovakia Information Service do not present their organizational structure in their websites.

The Czech Republic Security Information Service, in its Annual Report has presented its budget; however it has presented only the general amount and not the budgeting destination lines⁶⁶. The same way of presenting the budgeting data follow the Poland Internal Security Service⁶⁷ and Slovakia Information Service.⁶⁸ However, here it should be emphasized the fact that compared to the Serbia Security Information Agency, the Macedonian Information Agency and the Croatian Information Agency, these countries have lowest budgeting transparency, that's

⁶⁰ Security Information Service, <https://www.bis.cz/defaultEN.html>

⁶¹ Internal Security Service, <http://www.abw.gov.pl/en?dzial=>

⁶² Slovak Information Service http://www.sis.gov.sk/index_en.html

⁶³ Czech Republic and Poland since 12 March 1999, while Slovakia since 29 March 2004.

⁶⁴ Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia became members of EU on 1 May 2004.

⁶⁵ Croatia became a member of NATO on 1 April 2009, while a member of EU on 1 July 2013.

⁶⁶ Annual Report of the Security Information Service for 2014, <https://www.bis.cz/pdf/ar2014en.pdf> f. 30-31

⁶⁷ Internal Security Service, Annual Report 2009, <https://www.abw.gov.pl/en/about-isa/577,Annual-report-2009.html>, f.14

⁶⁸ Budget Spending, SIS Annual Report 2014, <http://www.sis.gov.sk/for-you/sis-annual-report.html>

why they cannot be considered with the most advanced practices of internal intelligence agencies in this field.

State	Name of the Agency	Mission	Legal Framework	Organizational Structure	Budget	Annual Report	Press Release
Czech Republic	Security Information Service	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Poland	Internal Security Agency	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Slovakia	Information Service of Slovakia	Yes	Yes	No	P Yes o	Yes	Yes

Yet, on the other hand, all these agencies have published on their websites their annual reports, which is something the Western Balkan countries do not practice.

The Security Information Service of Czech Republic on its Annual Report⁶⁹ provided the following information: a) intelligence activities and findings, respectively the protection of major economic interests, organized crime, counter – intelligence activities, constitutional and democratic foundation protection of the Czech Republic – the ethnic tensions growth and anti Roma protests, as well as the right and left extremism, terrorism, proliferation of mass destruction weapons, of conventional and explosive weapons and cybersecurity, b) The protection of classified information, respectively the administrative security, information and communication system’s security, physical security and crisis management; c) the cooperation with the Czech intelligence agencies and other state authorities, respectively intelligence services, police and other state authorities; d) the co-operation with foreign intelligence services; e) Supervision, respectively external supervision and internal audit; f) discipline

⁶⁹ Annual Report of the Security Information Service for 2014, <https://www.bis.cz/pdf/ar2014en.pdf>

maintenance and the treatment of demands and complaints; and g) the Budget – which, as stated earlier, it shows only the general amount.

On the other hand, the Annual Report of the Internal Security Service of Poland, ABW,⁷⁰ has a similar content and it shows: a) The role of ABW in the Poland Security Service, respectively the ABW and other intelligence agencies, duties, functions, advisory services, international cooperation, the budget, the staff and the supervision of ABW; b) The key fields of ABW's activities, respectively the fight against terrorism, the protection of cyberspace, the Poland counter-intelligence protection, the protection of state's economic interests, fighting corruption, fighting organized crime, the fight of proliferation of technology with dual exploitation, the fight of political extremism, the state and official secrets protection; c) the protective and preventive measures, respectively the counter-intelligence protection program, protective measures for safe use of the internet and against the danger of cyberspace, the programs for central administration employees treatments – including the prevention of corruption, the program for security official's treatments of classified information, the training for administrators and inspectors of IT networks, post-diplomatic studies on 'internal security', thematic conferences, ABW's publications and the public communication.

Meanwhile, the Annual Report of Slovakia's Information Service SIS⁷¹ has this content: a) SIS strategic focus: a.1 The security, respectively, anti-terrorism, security measures during the Winter Olympic Games in Sochi, illegal immigration, counter-intelligence, the fight against organized crime, the trading of defence industry products and proliferation and security of nuclear equipment and materials, extremism, pseudo religious groups, the issue of socially excluded communities, the protection of classified information, the protection of cyberspace; a.2 economy, respectively corruption and nepotism, inefficient management of state-owned and municipality assets, custom, taxes and finances frauds, Slovakia's financial system risks, Slovakia's energetic security, gas and fuel transit perspectives and Slovakia's supply; a.3. The

⁷⁰ Internal Security Service, Annual Report 2009, <https://www.abw.gov.pl/en/about-isa/577,Annual-report-2009.html>

⁷¹ Annual Report of the Security Information Service for 2014, <https://www.bis.cz/pdf/ar2014en.pdf>

external politics, respectively Ukraine, Russian Federation, Belarus, Western Balkans, the westerner's security assesment in some of Africa's and Asia's countries; b) The state troops cooperation – intelligence products for consumers; c) the condition, basic activities and SIS supervision; c.1. staff issues, respectively basic indicators, c.2. supply condition of material and technical tools, as well as the budgeting expenses, respectively the SIS budgeting expenses, c.3. the technical informative tools and secrecy of telecommunications, c.4. the cooperation with foreign intelligence services, c.5. legislation and supervision, c.6. the supervision of SIS legal activities done by Supervisory Commission of the National Council of Slovakia, which supervises the Slovakia's Information Service activities, d) the National Security Analytical Centre Report.

Some characteristic of annual reports of these Central Europe internal intelligence services are: the presentation of security risks and threats, the activities presented with numbers and the narrative way on how to treat these risks, the cooperation with other domestic security and intelligence institutions, international cooperation, internal and external supervision, staff management and the budget. The formats and the data presented in these Annual Reports can serve as an example of helpful practice for drafting declassified Annual Reports for Kosovo Intelligence Agency. However, the Central Europe agencies, as well as the Western Balkans internal intelligence agencies have not presented the numbers of their employees.

The public transparency of internal intelligence agencies: the Baltic States Practices

This section will treat the transparency practices and public accountability, respectively the website's data of the internal intelligence agency of Estonia (Internal Security Service, KAPO)⁷², Latvia (Latvia's Security Police DP)⁷³ and Lithuania (State Security Department, VSD)⁷⁴. As the

⁷² Estonian Internal Security Service, <https://www.kapo.ee/en.html>

⁷³ Latvian Security Police, <http://www.dp.gov.lv/en/>

⁷⁴ State Security Department, <http://www.vsd.lt/PageEN.aspx?pageID=169>

Central Europe countries, the Baltic States have successfully completed the transition and are now members of NATO⁷⁵ and EU⁷⁶.

As the following table shows, the internal intelligence agencies of these countries are characterized with a high level of general transparency compared with the same institutions of the Western Balkan countries (except Croatia), but they have a lower level of general transparency compared with the Central Europe countries, and this can be seen in the presentation of budgeting data.

The only internal intelligence agency for the Baltic States that has presented the budget is the Department of State Security of Lithuania – VSD, and this was provided in the Annual Reports, as a general sum, without further specifications. Compared to the countries of the western Balkans, such as Serbia, Macedonia and Croatia, the Baltic States have quite a lower level of budgetary transparency, and, as such, they cannot be taken as an example of advanced practices of transparency in this field. However, on the other hand, it should be noted the fact that, just like all the internal intelligence agencies of the Central European countries, as well as agencies in the Baltic States on their websites have published their reports, respectively, their annual reports.

State	Name of the Agency	Mission	Legal Framework	Organizational Structure	Budget	Annual Report	Press Release
Estonia	Estonian Internal Security Service	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Latvia	Security Police of Latvia	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes

⁷⁵The Baltic States are members of NATO since 29 March 2004.

⁷⁶The Baltic States are members of EU since 1 May 2004.

Lithuania	State Security Department	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
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Here it should be mentioned the fact that the longer tradition in providing annual reports is found to be in the Estonian Internal Security Service – KAPO, which has provided these statements as of 1998.⁷⁷ The last annual report⁷⁸ in the webpage of KAPO contains the following: a) Protection of constitutional order, events in Ukraine and intensification of the international situation, the regime of Putin and extremism in Europe, extremism without a broad base in Estonia, the Russian meaning of “soft power”, the exploitation of Russian expatriates, media projects of Russian’s influence operations, historical propaganda; b) counter intelligence, respectively the Gerasimov Doctrine; c) protection of state confidentiality, respectively, visits to high-risk countries, secure areas, aviation backgrounds checks; d) providing cyber security; f) the prevention of international terrorism, respectively the general situation, Syria and Iraq, the Muslim Community in Estonia, the release of OSCE observers, international cooperation in general, ensuring the security for the US President; g) the fight against corruption, or corruption that affects national security, corruption that undermines the law enforcement system; and h) investigation of timeless international crimes

On the other hand the Annual Report of Security Police of Latvia– DP⁷⁹ has the following content: a) Counterintelligence, respectively the activities of foreign security and intelligence agencies, protection of state secrets; b) maintenance of the constitutional order, namely, Russian policy toward compatriots, characterization of Russian’s compatriot policy, subjects of compatriot policy in Latvia, supporters of far-right and far-left-wing ideology; c) Latvian Supporters of Russian aggression in Ukraine, namely, public support, collection of donations, and joining illegal armed groups in Ukraine; d) security of information space; f) economic

⁷⁷ KAPO Annual Reviews, <https://www.kapo.ee/en/content/annual-reviews.html>

⁷⁸ Ibid, KAPO Annual Review 2014.

⁷⁹ Annual Report 2014, <http://www.dp.gov.lv/en/>

security; g) Counterterrorism, namely, terrorism threat tendencies in Europe, situation with the terrorism threats in Latvia; g) pre-trial investigation; h) dignitary protection.

In the end, the Annual Report of the State Security Department of Lithuania – VSD⁸⁰ has the following content: a) the scope of VSD activities, respectively, collected intelligence, intelligence information, findings and consultations, authorizations of VSD activities; b) hostile activities of foreign intelligence and security services, namely, the principles of the activities of the intelligence and security services hostile to Lithuania; c) information security, namely, the Russian ideological propaganda, Lithuanian information space; d) regional security, namely, Russian foreign policy and hybrid warfare, risk factors in Lithuania; f) economic and energy security, namely, the energy sector, economic sector; g) Extremism and Terrorism, respectively, political radicalism, terrorism; h) Annexes, respectively, VSD budget and the GDP growth in the period of 2000-2014, the education of intelligence officers, age of intelligence officers, intelligence officers as per gender.

From the description of the content of these reports, namely, of the annual reports of the internal intelligence services of the concerned countries, we can reach the conclusion that the handling of risks and threats of security are largely overruled by the circumstances and regional geopolitics, respectively from the breakdown of the Russian threat to the safety of these countries, and then the dangers of European and international security - including terrorism, are handled, but through a very simplified narration. The special feature of these reports is the materialization of successes in the fight against corruption and organized crime, which is a very important practice of the public accountability for the performance of these services, which could serve as a practice that could also be applied by KIA, in the event of publishing an eventual annual report. As it is the case of internal agencies of the Western Balkan countries and those of Central Europe, with the Baltic States it is also evident the absence of presenting the number of staff members of their internal intelligence agencies.

⁸⁰ VSD Annual Review 2014, <http://www.vsd.lt/Files/Documents/635718603371696250.pdf>

The (lack of) transparency of the Kosovo Intelligence Agency: How to move forward?

The Kosovo Intelligence Agency has a low level of public transparency, and from all the regional states reviewed above,⁸¹ it is in a better position only in comparison with the Security Information Agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁸² This low level of public transparency of the two intelligence agencies is rather surprising, when one considers the fact that both these agencies are created under international supervision.

State	Name of the Agency	Mission	Legal Framework	Organizational Structure	Budget	Annual Report	Press Release
Kosovo	Kosovo Intelligence Agency	Yes	Yes	No	Jo (Yes)	No	Yes

In the following analysis, we shall consider categorized information missing on the website of KIA – namely the budget, organizational structure and the annual reports – in relation to the best practices of public transparency of domestic intelligence agencies of Western Balkans, Central Europe and the Baltic States, which are discussed in the above sections.

Budget Transparency

As far as the budget transparency of KIA is concerned, although its budget is not provided in its web page, it can be found in the Law on the Budget of the Republic of Kosovo, and as such, it is even more detailed than the budgets provided by Croatia, the countries of the Central Europe and Lithuania. In this case, it is observed that KIA is the only intelligence agency, from all the

⁸¹ The below table shows the situation of the public transparency of KIA and this conclusion comes from the comparison with the above tables of the same format in which the data of the internal intelligence agencies are provided from the countries of western Balkans, Central Europe and the Baltic States.

⁸²The Security Information Agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina in its webpage, it does not only provide the organizational structure, budget or annual reports, it also has no column of media notifications

above reviewed countries, that has made public the number of its staff members, as it can be noticed from the presentation of its budget,⁸³ which is provided in the below table.

It should be emphasised also the fact that the presentation of a more detailed budget of KIA is limited on the basis of Article 40 of the Law on Kosovo Intelligence Agency,⁸⁴ and this is therefore considered as a classified information. However, this fact does not prevent KIA from presenting its budget in its web page in the same form as it is provided in the Law on the Budget of the Republic of Kosovo.

Financial Resources	Number of employees for 2016	Salaries and Wages	Goods and Services	Utilities	Subventions and Transfers	Capital Expenditures
Government Grants (Euro)	90	3,400,000	1,320,282	38,000	450,000	1,500,000

Total Expenditures (Euro): v.2016	Total Expenditures (Euro): v. 2017	Total Expenditures (Euro): v. 2018
6,708,282	6,208,282	6,208,282

In relation to good practices of budgetary aspects of the above stated intelligence agencies, it is observed the fact that in the web page of KIA there are no information about public procurement, and the failure to present them represents a great shortage in the public transparency of this institution. The presentation of the public procurement on the web page of KIA is not subjection of restriction on the basis of the Law on KIA; therefore there is no reason why this should be not available to the public.

⁸³ Law No. 05/L -071, Law on the Budget of the Republic of Kosovo, 2016, <https://mf.rks-gov.net/sq-al/Buxheti/Buxheti-i-Republikes-se-Kosoves/Buxheti-qendrore>

⁸⁴ Law No. 03/L-063, Law on Kosovo Intelligence Agency, http://www.aki-rks.org/2008_03-L063_al.pdf

As far as the audit of the KIA finances, it should be taken into account the fact that the detailed budget of KIA is considered classified information, and as a result the audit from the General Auditor Office is subject of this restriction, thus the mere option for public presentation is the presentation of an internal audit declassified. Pursuant to Article 10.4 of the Law on KIA, the financial audits of the activities of the KIA shall be the responsibility of the Inspector General, as a result of which these audits will be made available to the Prime Minister in addition to the KIA Director, what at first sight may look as a difficult legal restriction for the increase of the public transparency of the order and management of the finances of this institution. Yet, this fact does not create any insurmountable barrier for a general opinion of the internal audit in relation to the regularity of the financial management of the Inspector General, to be presented before the public, as well as the Parliamentary Committee for the Supervision of KIA, by preserving in the other that which is considered classified information as part of the Annual Internal Audit Report of KIA.

Transparency of the organizational structure

In the above analysis it has been noted also the good practice of the public transparency of the internal intelligence agencies through the presentation of the structures of their own organizations. Furthermore, presenting the organizational structure of KIA is not restricted by any legal limitation, and as such, it is not considered classified information. Therefore, presenting the organizational structure of KIA in its web page is necessary, and undertaking such a step it is by no doubt a necessary action towards the application of the good practices of the public transparency of the internal intelligence agencies.

Public Transparency of KIA's work: Annual Reports

A key element that would impact the increase of the public transparency and accountability of KIA is the publication of the Annual Report, as it is the practice in Croatia, the countries of the Central Europe and the Baltic States. Even despite the fact that these reports have different

contents, in general they all present the risks and threats that the security of these countries has encountered, the results of their activities are presented in numbers and in a narrative form they have presented the handling of the risks, the collaboration with the other institutions of the security and intelligence, the international cooperation, both external and internal supervision, the management of the personnel, as well as their budgets.

A similar method could be used for the eventual publication of the annual reports of KIA. Taking into consideration the fact that the mission of KIA is the identification of the “information concerning threats to the security of Kosovo” and further it is specified that “a threat to the security of Kosovo shall in any event be considered a threat against the territorial integrity, integrity of the institutions, the constitutional order, the economic stability and development, as well as threats against global security detrimental to Kosovo.”⁸⁵ Thus the annual would present initially exactly these threats in a declassified manner.

The other declassified information, through which the efficiency of KIA could be measured from the public, it would be the presenting of the data in regard to the obtained results from the gathering and the analysis of the information, in particular for matters for which KIA has an explicit legal mandate,⁸⁶ such as: terrorism; the incitement to, aiding and abetting or advocating of terrorism; espionage against Kosovo or detrimental to the security of Kosovo; sabotage directed against Kosovo’s vital infrastructure; organized crime against Kosovo or detrimental to the security of Kosovo in any other way, including money laundering; inciting the disaffection of security personnel; trafficking of illegal substances, weapons or human beings; illegal manufacturing or transport of weapons of mass destruction, or their components, as well as materials and devices necessary for their manufacture; illegal trafficking of products and technologies under International Control; activities that contravene international humanitarian law; acts of organized violence or intimidation against ethnic or religious groups in Kosovo; and matters relating to severe threats to public health or safety.

⁸⁵ Article 2, Law No. 03/L-063, Law on the Kosovo Intelligence Agency, http://www.aki-rks.org/2008_03-L063_al.pdf, 2008

⁸⁶Ibid.

Also, the significant declassified information that should be included in the annual reports of KIA is the cooperation with other domestic security institutions⁸⁷, and possibly even with the international ones.

A special section of the annual reports of KIA, on the basis of the best practices of the annual reports of state examined above, should be the presentation of the management of the KIA, including its organizational structure, professional and gender structure of its employees, the internal supervision by the Inspector General, the budget and the general statement of the declassified internal audit of its finances.

Making the annual reports public with these data would present a general envisage of the work of KIA and through this the public accountability would increase, which a variable of the same equation with the level of trust that this institution enjoys among the population of Kosovo.

Recommendations

Taking into consideration the fact that the Kosovo Intelligence Agency is one of the internal intelligence agencies with the lowest level of transparency among the countries of the Western Balkans, and since in the other hand it is also the security institution with the lowest level of trust among the citizens of Kosovo, it is necessary to be undertaken swift steps in order to increase the level of public transparency and accountability of this institution.

In order to achieve this, KIPRED recommends the following actions to be undertaken in order to complete the content of the official website of KIA:

⁸⁷ Intra-governmental cooperation is a legal requirement, pursuant to Article 8 of the Law on the Kosovo Intelligence Agency, Law No. 03/L-063, http://www.aki-rks.org/2008_03-L063_al.pdf, 2008

- a) Presentation of the budget in the same format as provided in the Law on the Budget of Kosovo;
- b) Presentation of the data from the public procurement
- c) Presentation of the general declassified opinion of the audit of finances of KIA from the General Inspector
- d) Presentation of the organizational structure and
- e) Presentation of the Public Annual Reports

5. BRIEF ANALYTICAL OVERVIEW OF THE PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH

One of the most significant purposes of this Observer is to determine the situation of the level of trust that the citizens of Kosovo have towards the institutions of security of Kosovo, to follow as well as analyse the varying trends of this trust in four-months-periods of time.

For this purpose KIPRED has engaged the organization UBO Consulting to measure periodically the level of this trust of citizens. Within this operation UBO Consulting has made a research survey of the public opinion, where 1.000 respondents participated in the survey, and they answered the question: "Could you tell us how much you trust the following institutions regarding security related matters?" Again the given institutions were the following: 1) the President; 2) the Prime Minister; 3) the Minister of Internal Affairs; 4) the Kosovo Police; 5) the

Parliamentary Committee for Security, Internal Affairs and the Kosovo Security Force; 6) the Minister of the Security Force; 7) the Kosovo Security Force; 8) the Kosovo Intelligence Agency; 9) the Director of the Kosovo Intelligence Agency; and, 10) the Parliamentary Committee for Intelligence. The expression of trust was made from the lowest grade, 1, up to the highest one, 5, and the margin of error was $\pm 3\%$.

Compared to the first survey, whose outcome was summarised in November 2015, in the current survey it is noticed a decline of the level of trust in all of the above stated institutions and this decrease is provided in the first chart (Table 1). From this table we can draw some significant conclusions. The highest increase is marked by the Minister of KSF (+0.14) and the Kosovo Security Force (+0.11), to be followed by the Kosovo Police (+0.06). As a result of these trends in trust, KSF again reached the first place with 3.69, whereas KP took the second place with 3.64. The level of trust for the Kosovo Intelligence Agency, its Director and the Parliamentary Committee for Security, Internal Affairs and the Kosovo Security Force has not had any change, whereas the greatest decline in trust is experienced by the Prime Minister (-0.19), the Parliamentary Committee for Intelligence (-0.15) and the Minister of Internal Affairs (-0.14), to be followed by the President (-0.01).

Other important and interesting issues that came from the February 2016 survey (compared with that of November) are provided as below:

- Among the Albanians who live in the North of Kosovo, two highest grades were given for the Kosovo Security Force (4.00) and Kosovo Police (3.09). Meanwhile, the two lowest grades the Albanians who live in the North of Kosovo were for the President, Kosovo Intelligence Agency and the Parliamentary Committee for Intelligence (1.36 for the three institutions), which have experienced an emphasised decline in their trust.
- Among the Serbs living in the North, there is a high trend of increase of trust with the Kosovo Police (+1.04), to be followed by the President (+0.54), Prime Minister (+0.21) and Minister of Internal Affairs (0.05), whereas for all other institutions the trust is

almost inexistent (1). Also, among Serbs living in the South there are similar trends of trust, meaning there is an increase for the President (+1.23), Kosovo Police (0.87), Prime Minister (0.68) and Minister of Internal Affairs (0.21), whereas for all other institutions the trust is almost inexistent.

- There are no special trends, as far as trust is concerned, as per gender, and the results of the February 2016 survey are very similar to the November 2015 survey. Meanwhile, as far as the age variable is concerned, there is a slight decline of trust towards the Prime Minister and the Minister of Internal Affairs among almost all age groups, and almost all age groups have expressed a small increase of trust towards Kosovo Police, the Ministry of KSF and KSF. The education variable observes a similar level of trust as expressed in November 2015 survey; changes, if detected, are generally small, and largely dispersed, therefore, they do not show any particular trend.
- Among the respondents, with different ethnicities, there is an interesting trend of trust expressed for the respective institutions by the Serbs. The question is about a significant increase of trust among Serbs for the following institutions: the trust of Serbs for the President is (increase +0.97), the trust for the Prime Minister is 1.65 (increase +0.52), the trust for the Kosovo Police is 2.29 (increase +0.94), and the trust for the Minister of Internal Affairs is 1.29 (increase +0.16). The trust of Serbs for other institutions is inexistent or almost inexistent. Whereas the trust of Albanians and other communities for these institutions is quite similar to the one expressed in the survey four month ago. Here it is deemed worthy to conduct a research in order to identify the factors, features and events that could have caused such an increase in the levels of trust among Serbs, in order for them to be favoured in the next processes.
- As far as the occupation variable is concerned, there are no significant changes, and even these are quite dispersed. As in the two previous surveys, again, the highest trust in the reviewed institutions is given by the category of housewives, and, again, the category of employees in the public sector has expressed the lowest level of trust. So, again, the question is raised as to why the category which is the most distant from the public institutions has the highest level trust towards these institutions, yet, the

category that is closest to these institutions, and sometimes even existing within them, they have the lowest level of trust towards them.

- Among the respondents, from different regions, it is noticed that the highest level of trust is found to be among the citizens of Ferizaj, whereas the lowest level of trust is found among the citizens of Gjakova. Furthermore, the trust of the citizens of Ferizaj in these institutions marks an increasing trend compared with the trust that they have expressed in November 2015, however, the confidence of the citizens of Gjakova remains more or less the same - variations in the trust of citizens Gjakova are dispersed thereof.
- And, finally, when considering the trust among ethnicities as expressed by region, it is noticed the above mentioned trend, whereat Serbs indicate an increase of trust towards the President, Prime Minister, the Kosovo Police and the Minister of Internal Affairs. Otherwise, this increasing trend related to the trust among Serbs is mostly pronounced among the Serbs of Gjilan, Prishtina, Ferizaj and Peja. Also, quite a high level of trust is expressed by the Serbs of Mitrovica, however, this does not represent an increasing trend since the Serbs of Mitrovica have expressed such a high level of trust even in survey of November 2015.

Could you, please , tell us how much do you trust to the below-mentioned security institutions?					
	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
The President	995	1	5	2.68	1.241
The Primeminister	995	1	5	2.31	1.229
Minister of internal Affairs	973	1	5	2.35	1.130
The Kosovo Police	992	1	5	3.64	1.310
Committee on Internal Affairs, Security and Supervision of the Kosovo Security Force	951	1	5	2.71	1.184
The Minister of the Security Force	975	1	5	3.00	1.325
Forcës së Sigurisë së Kosovës	990	1	5	3.69	1.383
The Kosovar Agency of Intelligence	931	1	5	2.57	1.167
The Director of the Kosovar Agency of Intelligence	918	1	5	2.40	1.136
Oversight Committee for Kosovo Intelligence Agency	894	1	5	2.38	1.099

Table 1 - General trust in the institutions

Could you, please , tell us how much do you trust to the below-mentioned security institutions?				
Alternativat	Jul-15	Nov-15	Feb-16	Difference (Feb 2016 - Jul 2015)
	Mean	Mean	Mean	
The President	2.95	2.69	2.68	-0.272
The Primeminister	2.67	2.50	2.31	-0.358
Minister of internal Affairs	2.75	2.49	2.35	-0.404
The Kosovo Police	3.79	3.58	3.64	-0.147
Committee on Internal Affairs, Security and Supervision of the Kosovo Security Force	3.17	2.71	2.71	-0.464
The Minister of the Security Force	3.33	2.86	3.00	-0.327
Forcës së Sigurisë së Kosovës	4.00	3.58	3.69	-0.307
The Kosovar Agency of Intelligence	3.02	2.57	2.57	-0.449
The Director of the Kosovar Agency of Intelligence	2.88	2.40	2.40	-0.478
Oversight Committee for Kosovo Intelligence Agency	3.01	2.52	2.38	-0.635

Table 2. Comparison of trust throughout months

Could you, please , tell us how much do you trust to the below-mentioned security institutions?											
Ethnicity		The President	The Primeminister	Minister of internal Affairs	The Kosovo Police	Committee on Internal Affairs, Security and Supervision of the Kosovo Security Force	The Minister of the Security Force	The Kosovo Security Force	The Kosovar Agency of Intelligence	The Director of the Kosovar Agency of Intelligence	Oversight Committee for Kosovo Intelligence Agency
Albanian	Mean	1.36	1.45	1.64	3.09	1.64	1.64	4.00	1.36	1.55	1.36
	N	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11

Table 3 - Albanians in the North

Could you, please , tell us how much do you trust to the below-mentioned security institutions?											
Serbs: North,South		The President	The Primeminister	Minister of internal Affairs	The Kosovo Police	Committee on Internal Affairs, Security and Supervision of the Kosovo Security Force	The Minister of the Security Force	The Kosovo Security Force	The Kosovar Agency of Intelligence	The Director of the Kosovar Agency of Intelligence	Oversight Committee for Kosovo Intelligence Agency
Serbs, North	Mean	1.54	1.21	1.05	2.04	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
	N	56	56	56	56	56	56	56	56	56	56
Serbs, South	Mean	2.46	1.90	1.44	2.45	1.03	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.15
	N	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94
Total	Mean	2.11	1.65	1.29	2.29	1.02	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.09
	N	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150

Table 4 - Serbs in the North – South

Could you, please , tell us how much do you trust to the below-mentioned security institutions?											
Type of resident		The President	The Primeminister	Minister of internal Affairs	The Kosovo Police	Committee on Internal Affairs, Security and Supervision of the Kosovo Security Force	The Minister of the Security Force	The Kosovo Security Force	The Kosovar Agency of Intelligence	The Director of the Kosovar Agency of Intelligence	Oversight Committee for Kosovo Intelligence Agency
Urban	Mean	2.68	2.23	2.27	3.64	2.67	3.01	3.52	2.46	2.33	2.26
	N	428	429	417	424	409	416	427	405	395	379
Rural	Mean	2.68	2.38	2.40	3.64	2.73	2.99	3.82	2.66	2.46	2.46
	N	567	566	556	568	543	559	563	526	523	514
Total	Mean	2.68	2.31	2.35	3.64	2.71	3.00	3.69	2.57	2.40	2.38
	N	995	995	973	992	951	975	990	931	918	894

Table 5 - Residence

Could you, please , tell us how much do you trust to the below-mentioned security institutions?											
Gender		The President	The Primeminister	Minister of internal Affairs	The Kosovo Police	Committee on Internal Affairs, Security and Supervision of the Kosovo Security Force	The Minister of the Security Force	The Kosovo Security Force	The Kosovar Agency of Intelligence	The Director of the Kosovar Agency of Intelligence	Oversight Committee for Kosovo Intelligence Agency
Male	Mean	2.52	2.19	2.21	3.59	2.58	2.93	3.70	2.49	2.36	2.30
	N	517	518	510	515	496	507	515	495	493	481
Female	Mean	2.85	2.45	2.50	3.70	2.85	3.08	3.68	2.66	2.45	2.47
	N	478	477	463	477	455	468	474	436	426	413
Total	Mean	2.68	2.31	2.35	3.64	2.71	3.00	3.69	2.57	2.40	2.38
	N	995	995	973	992	951	975	990	931	918	894

Table 6 Gender

Could you, please , tell us how much do you trust to the below-mentioned security institutions?											
Age		The President	The Primeminister	Minister of internal Affairs	The Kosovo Police	Committee on Internal Affairs, Security and Supervision of the Kosovo Security Force	The Minister of the Security Force	The Kosovo Security Force	The Kosovar Agency of Intelligence	The Director of the Kosovar Agency of Intelligence	Oversight Committee for Kosovo Intelligence Agency
18-24	Mean	2.61	2.26	2.31	3.72	2.77	3.02	3.72	2.65	2.43	2.42
	N	307	306	296	306	287	297	307	285	284	271
25-34	Mean	2.54	2.28	2.19	3.54	2.65	2.85	3.57	2.55	2.37	2.30
	N	265	265	261	263	258	261	262	256	247	243
35-44	Mean	2.66	2.43	2.51	3.63	2.68	3.00	3.74	2.53	2.41	2.34
	N	173	174	173	174	169	171	173	159	159	155
45-54	Mean	2.86	2.32	2.45	3.52	2.62	3.01	3.68	2.55	2.40	2.42
	N	137	137	132	136	129	135	136	129	127	126
55-64	Mean	3.04	2.52	2.53	3.77	2.82	3.29	3.88	2.59	2.44	2.48
	N	84	84	84	84	80	82	83	76	74	72
65 +	Mean	2.91	1.93	2.08	4.06	2.86	3.22	3.75	2.28	2.18	2.36
	N	29	29	28	29	28	29	29	27	27	27
Total	Mean	2.68	2.31	2.35	3.64	2.71	3.00	3.69	2.57	2.40	2.38
	N	995	995	973	992	951	975	990	931	918	894

Table 7 - Age

Could you, please , tell us how much do you trust to the below-mentioned security institutions?											
Education		The President	The Primeminister	Minister of internal Affairs	The Kosovo Police	Committee on Internal Affairs, Security and Supervision of the Kosovo Security Force	The Minister of the Security Force	The Kosovo Security Force	The Kosovar Agency of Intelligence	The Director of the Kosovar Agency of Intelligence	Oversight Committee for Kosovo Intelligence Agency
Elementary schole or less	Mean	2.89	2.57	2.63	3.71	2.77	3.16	3.84	2.74	2.50	2.53
	N	165	167	162	167	150	161	167	145	141	138
Secondary school	Mean	2.65	2.22	2.31	3.62	2.68	3.01	3.73	2.54	2.36	2.33
	N	484	482	474	484	467	477	480	453	452	442
College	Mean	2.55	2.34	2.29	3.54	2.62	2.77	3.40	2.53	2.40	2.37
	N	252	252	245	248	245	248	252	245	240	230
Master or doctoral	Mean	2.81	2.26	2.18	3.92	2.97	3.30	4.00	2.58	2.43	2.41
	N	94	94	92	94	90	89	91	89	85	84
Total	Mean	2.68	2.31	2.35	3.64	2.71	3.00	3.69	2.57	2.40	2.38
	N	995	995	973	992	951	975	990	931	918	894

Table 8 - Education

Could you, please , tell us how much do you trust to the below-mentioned security institutions?											
Actual Profession		The President	The Primeminister	Minister of Internal Affairs	The Kosovo Police	Committee on Internal Affairs, Security and Supervision of the Kosovo Security Force	The Minister of the Security Force	The Kosovo Security Force	The Kosovar Agency of Intelligence	The Director of the Kosovar Agency of Intelligence	Oversight Committee for Kosovo Intelligence Agency
Unemployed; searching for job	Mean	2.62	2.13	2.19	3.47	2.61	2.84	3.70	2.56	2.39	2.28
	N	259	258	254	259	242	254	259	235	232	223
Unemployed; not searching for job	Mean	2.86	2.35	2.34	3.91	2.83	2.96	4.14	2.79	2.42	2.44
	N	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	29	28	28
Employed in the public sector	Mean	2.58	2.43	2.35	3.85	2.69	2.84	3.65	2.56	2.38	2.42
	N	68	68	68	68	66	68	68	66	64	64
Employed in the private sector	Mean	2.47	2.13	2.18	3.53	2.65	3.01	3.63	2.45	2.34	2.31
	N	256	257	253	255	252	252	256	247	245	236
Employed, periodically	Mean	2.61	2.33	2.33	3.31	2.47	2.74	3.39	2.45	2.25	2.18
	N	67	67	67	67	65	65	65	67	67	65
Retiree	Mean	2.79	1.90	2.02	3.91	2.89	3.21	3.55	2.35	2.18	2.34
	N	33	33	32	33	32	33	33	31	31	31
Hous-wife	Mean	3.12	2.87	2.97	3.96	3.02	3.32	3.81	2.80	2.57	2.62
	N	132	132	129	132	128	130	129	116	117	117
Student/pupil	Mean	2.76	2.46	2.46	3.83	2.77	3.16	3.75	2.68	2.51	2.53
	N	142	142	131	141	129	135	142	134	129	124
Other,specify	Mean	2.80	2.80	2.20	3.00	2.60	2.60	4.00	3.00	2.40	2.40
	N	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
Total	Mean	2.68	2.31	2.35	3.64	2.71	3.00	3.69	2.57	2.40	2.38
	N	995	995	973	992	951	975	990	931	918	894

Table 9. Employment

Could you, please , tell us how much do you trust to the below-mentioned security institutions?											
Ethnicity		The President	The Primeminister	Minister of Internal Affairs	The Kosovo Police	Committee on Internal Affairs, Security and Supervision of the Kosovo Security Force	The Minister of the Security Force	The Kosovo Security Force	The Kosovar Agency of Intelligence	The Director of the Kosovar Agency of Intelligence	Oversight Committee for Kosovo Intelligence Agency
Albanian	Mean	2.70	2.33	2.38	3.71	2.78	3.08	3.81	2.63	2.45	2.43
	N	753	753	737	751	722	740	749	706	697	679
Serbs	Mean	2.11	1.65	1.29	2.29	1.02	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.09
	N	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150
Other	Mean	2.71	2.66	2.75	3.55	2.89	3.12	3.58	3.00	2.72	2.67
	N	92	92	87	92	79	83	92	77	72	66
Total	Mean	2.61	2.26	2.24	3.48	2.51	2.76	3.37	2.40	2.24	2.22
	N	995	995	974	993	951	973	991	933	919	895

Table 10. Ethnic background

Could you, please , tell us how much do you trust to the below-mentioned security institutions?											
Region		The President	The Primeminister	Minister of internal Affairs	The Kosovo Police	Committee on Internal Affairs, Security and Supervision of the Kosovo Security Force	The Minister of the Security Force	The Kosovo Security Force	The Kosovar Agency of Intelligence	The Director of the Kosovar Agency of Intelligence	Oversight Committee for Kosovo Intelligence Agency
Prishtina	Mean	2.65	2.22	2.27	3.77	2.78	3.13	3.68	2.52	2.29	2.19
	N	251	251	233	249	212	231	248	226	213	192
Mitrovica	Mean	2.30	2.49	2.49	3.47	2.46	2.79	3.04	2.43	2.33	2.41
	N	99	98	100	100	100	100	99	99	99	100
Prizreni	Mean	2.41	2.38	2.29	3.46	2.64	2.90	3.75	2.73	2.67	2.67
	N	165	166	164	165	164	165	166	164	165	165
Peja	Mean	3.33	2.65	2.33	3.87	2.52	2.79	3.96	2.78	2.26	2.16
	N	92	92	90	92	87	89	92	88	85	81
Ferizaj	Mean	3.42	2.64	2.69	4.35	3.20	3.77	4.42	2.39	2.29	2.26
	N	100	100	100	100	100	100	98	70	69	69
Gjakova	Mean	2.28	1.87	2.20	2.28	2.11	2.27	2.32	2.25	2.12	2.09
	N	99	99	99	99	99	99	99	97	99	99
Gjilan	Mean	2.76	2.24	2.13	3.57	2.43	2.34	3.04	2.28	2.17	2.29
	N	122	122	121	121	122	122	122	122	122	122
North of Kosovo	Mean	1.51	1.25	1.15	2.21	1.10	1.10	1.49	1.06	1.09	1.06
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67
Total	Mean	2.61	2.26	2.24	3.48	2.51	2.76	3.37	2.40	2.24	2.22
	N	995	995	974	993	951	973	991	933	919	895

Table 11. Region

Could you, please , tell us how much do you trust to the below-mentioned security institutions?												
Ethnicity/Region			The President	The Primeminister	Minister of internal Affairs	The Kosovo Police	Committee on Internal Affairs, Security and Supervision of the Kosovo Security Force	The Minister of the Security Force	The Kosovo Security Force	The Kosovar Agency of Intelligence	The Director of the Kosovar Agency of Intelligence	Oversight Committee for Kosovo Intelligence Agency
Albanians	Prishtina	Mean	2.69	2.19	2.30	3.85	2.97	3.32	3.88	2.62	2.40	2.31
		N	204	204	191	202	178	193	201	188	178	163
	Mitrovica	Mean	2.39	2.66	2.72	3.73	2.72	3.12	3.43	2.63	2.55	2.62
		N	80	79	81	81	81	81	80	81	80	81
	Prizreni	Mean	2.39	2.31	2.22	3.53	2.56	2.86	3.86	2.66	2.60	2.56
		N	135	136	134	135	134	135	136	134	135	135
	Peja	Mean	3.38	2.67	2.34	4.01	2.57	2.91	4.15	2.90	2.33	2.24
		N	81	81	79	81	76	78	81	77	75	71
	Ferizaj	Mean	3.55	2.68	2.77	4.56	3.47	4.16	4.95	2.58	2.53	2.49
		N	77	77	77	77	77	77	75	52	53	53
	Gjakova	Mean	2.25	1.84	2.15	2.19	2.09	2.21	2.26	2.20	2.07	2.09
		N	89	89	89	89	89	89	89	87	89	89
	Gjilan	Mean	2.79	2.38	2.49	4.31	3.28	3.14	4.28	3.05	2.88	2.95
		N	76	76	75	75	76	76	76	76	76	76
	North of Kosovo	Mean	1.36	1.45	1.64	3.09	1.64	1.64	4.00	1.36	1.55	1.36
		N	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11
	Total	Mean	2.70	2.33	2.38	3.71	2.78	3.08	3.81	2.63	2.45	2.43
		N	753	753	737	751	722	740	749	706	697	679
Serbs	Prishtina	Mean	2.30	1.95	1.40	2.65	1.05	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.25
		N	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20
	Mitrovica	Mean	2.33	2.00	1.33	2.33	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
		N	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9
	Peja	Mean	1.83	1.67	1.17	1.33	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
		N	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
	Ferizaj	Mean	2.15	1.54	1.31	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
		N	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13
	Gjilan	Mean	2.72	2.00	1.54	2.37	1.04	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.20
		N	46	46	46	46	46	46	46	46	46	46
	North of Kosovo	Mean	1.54	1.21	1.05	2.04	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
		N	56	56	56	56	56	56	56	56	56	56
	Total	Mean	2.11	1.65	1.29	2.29	1.02	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.09
		N	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150
Other	Prishtina	Mean	2.59	2.63	2.77	4.04	2.86	3.50	4.19	3.17	2.67	2.11
		N	27	27	22	27	14	18	27	18	15	9
	Mitrovica	Mean	1.60	1.60	1.70	2.40	1.70	1.70	1.80	2.11	1.80	2.00
		N	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	9	10	10
	Prizreni	Mean	2.50	2.70	2.57	3.17	3.00	3.07	3.27	3.07	3.00	3.17
		N	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30
	Peja	Mean	4.20	3.60	3.60	4.60	3.60	3.00	4.40	3.20	2.75	2.50
		N	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	4
	Ferizaj	Mean	4.10	3.80	3.90	4.50	4.00	4.40	4.90	4.00	3.67	3.67
		N	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	5	3	3
	Gjakova	Mean	2.60	2.10	2.70	3.10	2.30	2.80	2.90	2.70	2.60	2.10
		N	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
	Total	Mean	2.71	2.66	2.75	3.55	2.89	3.12	3.58	3.00	2.72	2.67
		N	92	92	87	92	79	83	92	77	72	66

Table 12. Region – Ethnicity

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